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DEEP POCKET JURISPRUDENCE: WHERE TORT 





 & CHRISTOPHER E. APPEL
***
 
Civil and criminal laws have long been premised on the fundamental 
principle that one is responsible only for his or her own misdeeds. The 
wickedness of the wicked will be charged solely against them. There have 
been times in American courtrooms, though, where this age-old adage has 
been cast aside. A sympathetic plaintiff has been injured or public lands or 
waterways have been polluted, but the party responsible for causing the 
harm is unknown or cannot pay the damages. So the plaintiff sues someone 
else, often a peripheral or attenuated business, to pay the claim. Maybe this 
other company made the product the at-fault party used to cause the harm, 
made similar products, or contracted with the at-fault party for related 
services. In each scenario, the company in the courtroom did not cause the 
harm, but dismissing the claim against that defendant would mean the 
victim would have no recourse. What are courts to do? 
Most courts apply the law impartially. Dedicated to the objective pursuit 
of justice, judges relate the facts to the cause of action and dismiss any 
defendant that did not factually or legally cause the alleged harm. A handful 
of courts, however, have taken a different approach: they have changed the 
law to allow a finding of liability or have admitted unsupported scientific 
theories to connect the defendant to the plaintiff’s alleged harm. These 
courts generally offer some wordy legal rationale to prop up their rulings, 
but a few have been surprisingly candid as to why they changed tort law to 
allow these claims. A New York judge unveiled the truth when he 
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acknowledged he was allowing a clean-up action to proceed against a 




In 2014, the Iowa Supreme Court called out these types of end-game 
oriented rulings as “[d]eep-pocket jurisprudence.”
2
 In the case before that 
court, a plaintiff was suing the manufacturer of a brand-name drug even 
though he only took generic versions of the drug, which were made and 
sold by entirely different companies.
3
 In dismissing the case, the Iowa 
Supreme Court stated, “Deep pocket jurisprudence is law without 
principle.”
4
 It then cautioned courts not to extract payments from those who 
did not cause the harms alleged. 
This article examines four areas of tort law where outlier courts have 
engaged in “deep pocket jurisprudence.” Part I explains the “innovator 
liability” theories at the heart of the Iowa Supreme Court case. Part II looks 
at government suits against manufacturers and others in the chain of 
commerce to pay the costs of environmental or social harms caused not by 
the companies themselves, but by users of their products. Part III examines 
attempts to subject businesses to liability for harms caused by employees of 
independent contractors. Finally, Part IV looks at car accident cases where 
the true party at fault (such as an uninsured driver) is unable to pay the full 
claim, so the court allows a speculative design claim to make the car 
manufacturer pay for some or all of the injuries. The article concludes that 
deep pocket jurisprudence should be rejected in all forms and that, often, it 
is the responsibility of the appellate courts to assure a just result.  
I. Deep Pocket Jurisprudence in Pharmaceutical 
Innovator Liability Litigation  
Innovator liability theories first surfaced in prescription drug litigation in 
the 1990s. A creative plaintiff’s lawyer attempted to subject the brand-name 
manufacturer of a prescription drug to liability for a client’s injury even 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1983), 
aff’d, State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
 2. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Victor E. 
Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name Medicines 
When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side Effects, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1872 (2013)); see also Kingman v. Dillard’s, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d 
732, 734 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (referring to the need for courts to avoid reliance on deep pocket 
jurisprudence), aff'd, Kingsman v. Dillard's, Inc., 721 F.3d 613 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 3. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 358-61. 
 4. Id. (citing Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 1872).  
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though the plaintiff acknowledged that he took only the generic forms of 
the drug, which were made by other companies.
5
 Since then, more than a 
hundred courts have rejected innovator liability, generally finding that 
under bedrock principles of both product liability and negligence, a 
manufacturer is not subject to liability for harms caused by a product that it 
did not make or sell.
6
 Starting in 2008, however, a few courts broke from 
this orthodoxy. For example, a California Court of Appeal recently held 
that such liability can follow the innovator into perpetuity, even after it 
stops making the medicine.
7
 This court can be commended for its openness: 
it acknowledged that, in part, its ruling was intended to provide the plaintiff 
with a deep pocket to sue in the event the generic drug’s manufacturer 
could not be held liable or provide sufficient damages.
8
 
A. Innovator Liability and Traditional Tort Law Principles 
The reason innovator liability has been largely rejected is because it 
conflicts with a basic tenet of American tort law: there must be a legal 
relationship, or duty, between a plaintiff and defendant for liability to arise 
from that relationship. A product manufacturer has a duty of care to its own 
customers to make lawful, non-defective products.
9
 Under traditional tort 
law, a manufacturer does not have a duty, in strict liability or negligence, to 
people who use other manufacturers’ products.
10
 The mere fact that the 
innovator created, designed, or manufactured the initial product does not 
create such an expansive duty of care. Otherwise, as the courts have 
explained, innovators would be de facto insurers of categories of products, 
many of which they never made or sold.
11
  
                                                                                                                 
 5. See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 2. 
 6. See James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, Scorecard: Innovator Liability in Generic 
Drug Cases, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Nov. 12, 2009), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/ 
2009/11/scorecard-non-manufacturer-name-brand.html.  
 7. See infra Section I.A. 
 8. See T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768 (Ct. App.), superseded by 
grant of review H.(T.) v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 371 P.3d 241 (Cal. 2016). 
 9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1998) (setting forth product liability principles for sellers of prescription drugs). 
 10. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 991 (Cal. 2012). 
 11. See, e.g., Bell v. Pfizer Inc., No. 5:10CV00101, 2011 WL 904161, *3 (E.D. Ark. 
Mar. 16, 2011) (“[I]f Bell's position were adopted, brand-name drug manufactures [sic] 
would essentially become the insurers of the generic manufacturers. Not only would brand-
name manufacturers bear all of the up-front costs associated with developing drugs, 
navigating the regulatory maze to obtain FDA approval, and then marketing those drugs, but 
they would also serve as the permanent insurers for the generic manufacturers, who bear 
none of the up-front costs.”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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Five courts have broken from these tenets over the past few years by 
accepting innovator liability in the context of prescription drugs.
12
 These 
courts include two California appellate courts; two federal district courts, 
one interpreting the law of Vermont and the other the law of Illinois; and 
the Alabama Supreme Court.
13
 Generally, these courts have held that users 
of generic drugs could pursue the manufacturers of the brand-name drugs 
under the theory of negligent misrepresentation.
14
 Traditional negligent 
misrepresentation law, though, does not apply to these situations. A 
defendant must have made a false or misleading statement about the 
product the plaintiff is purchasing, which here is a generic drug, in order to 
be subject to liability for the plaintiff’s harms from that product.
15
 The tort 
is specific to the transaction the defendant tried to influence. In these 
lawsuits, the innovators are not accused of improperly influencing anyone 
to purchase generic versions of their drugs. Thus, even under the tort of 
negligent misrepresentation, there is no legal basis or connection between 
the innovator and plaintiff who bought generic drugs for this liability. 
Nevertheless, these courts gave the users of generic drugs a legal work-
around: they held that the plaintiffs could base their negligent 
misrepresentation claims against the brand-name drug manufacturers solely 
on statements the innovators made about their own drugs years earlier when 
they were marketing and selling these products.
16
 The courts held that if a 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See Dolin v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 62 F. Supp. 3d 705 (N.D. Ill. 2014); 
Kellogg v. Wyeth, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Vt. 2010); Novartis Pharm. Corp., 199 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 768; Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649 (Ala. 2014); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 13. See cases cited supra note 12.  
 14. See, e.g., Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311 (“[A] defendant that authors and 
disseminates information about a product manufactured and sold by another may be liable 
for negligent misrepresentation where the defendant should reasonably expect others to rely 
on that information and the product causes injury, even though the defendant would not be 
liable in strict products liability because it did not manufacture or sell the product.”). 
 15. It is hornbook tort law that in misrepresentation cases, “the defendant is not liable if 
the plaintiff relies on the information in a type of transaction the defendant does not intend to 
influence.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 480, at 1372 (1st ed. 2000). Brand-name 
drug companies are not making representations or omissions about generic versions of a 
drug or versions of a drug that a successor company may sell. They are solely informing 
physicians about their own products, often years before generic drugs enter the market or 
they sell the product line to another company.  
 16. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 677 (finding that it was not “fundamentally unfair” to hold 
brand-name manufacturers liable for deficiencies in warning when the deficiencies were 
“merely repeated” by generic manufacturers); Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 1850 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/2
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brand-name drug manufacturer misrepresented facts leading to those 
transactions, it was “foreseeable” that patients, even many years later, could 
be harmed by generic versions of that drug.
17
  
To support these conclusions, the courts made three observations. First, 
physicians may prescribe a generic drug based on what he or she learned 
about the brand-name drug in the Physician’s Desk Reference and other 
materials.
18
 Second, federal drug law requires generics to have the same 
labeling as their brand-name counterparts.
19
 And third, under state law, a 
pharmacy often must fill a prescription with an available generic.
20
  
As indicated above, more than one hundred courts, including several 
federal courts of appeals, have rejected these arguments because a duty in 
tort law requires more to sustain it than mere foreseeability. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained the fallacy with these rulings: 
“generic consumers’ injuries are not the foreseeable result of the brand 
manufacturers’ conduct, but of laws over which the brand manufacturers 
have no control.”
21
 It was Congress, not the brand-name manufacturer, that 
made the public policy decision to lower barriers of entry for generic 
drugs.
22
 Similarly, state legislatures enacted the laws that require many 
prescriptions to be filled with available generics.
23
 Using these laws as a 
basis for supplying the duty element, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “stretches 
foreseeability too far.”
24
 As one Florida court put it, “[n]o federal statute or 
FDA regulation imposes a duty or suggests that a name brand manufacturer 
is responsible for the labeling of competing generic products.”
25
 
                                                                                                                 
(discussing Kellogg and noting that “[i]t was during this time and upon this information . . . 
that physicians’ knowledge of a drug was shaped”). 
 17. See, e.g., Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 315 (“[W]e find the conclusion inescapable that 
Wyeth knows or should know that a significant number of patients whose doctors rely on its 
product information for Reglan are likely to have generic metoclopramide prescribed or 
dispensed to them.”). 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 307 (stating the claims “premised on misrepresentations in Wyeth's 
labeling of Reglan and in a monograph on Reglan it provided for the Physician's Desk 
Reference”). 
 19. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2, at 1849-52.  
 20. See Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (finding that “[u]sually the prescriber will not 
know which generic version will be dispensed by the pharmacy”). 
 21. In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig. 756 F.3d 917, 944 (6th 
Cir. 2014). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Dietrich v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 50-2009-CA-021586, 2009 WL 4924722, at *7 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2009). 
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Courts have been warning against over-reliance on foreseeability since 
Judge Cardozo’s famous 1928 opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 
Co.
26
 “We trace the consequences, not indefinitely, but to a certain point. 
And to aid us in fixing that point we ask what might ordinarily be expected 
to follow” the alleged misconduct.
27
 The California Supreme Court, which 
currently has an innovator liability case under review, cautioned in another 
well-known case, Thing v. La Chusa, that on clear days “a court can foresee 
forever.”
28




Because of observations like these, foreseeability is supposed to be only 
one factor in creating a legal duty. Courts must also consider public policy 
implications and basic fairness, including whether the defendant had control 
over the risk that allegedly harmed the plaintiff, the relationship of the 
parties, and the remoteness of the conduct to the alleged harm.
30
 When 
innovator liability first arose in the 1990s, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit explained that the tort of negligent misrepresentation 
requires a relationship where “one party has the right to rely for information 
upon the other, and the other giving the information owes a duty to give it 
with care.”
31
 In cases of innovator liability, the overwhelming number of 
courts have found there is no qualifying relationship between the plaintiffs 
and innovator defendants. 
The current case before the California Supreme Court highlights the 
dangers of foreseeing forever. A California Court of Appeal held that the 
brand-name drug innovator could be subject to liability for harms caused by 
other companies’ generic drugs, even though the innovator completely 
divested this product line to another manufacturer years before the plaintiff 
alleges the generic was made, purchased, or caused injury.
32
 Even if the 
innovator misrepresented a fact about its drug years earlier, the law should 
not countenance such a perpetual duty to all future consumers of anyone’s 
                                                                                                                 
 26. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 27. Id. at 105. 
 28. 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989) (en banc). 
 29. Id. at 828. 
 30. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 
358 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (noting duty is “an expression of the 
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is 
entitled to protection”).  
 31. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Weisman v. Connors, 540 A.2d 783, 790 (Md. 1988) (applying Maryland law). 
 32. T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 770 (Ct. App.), superseded by 
grant of review H.(T.) v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 371 P.3d 241 (Cal. 2016). 
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comparable drug. The conduct is too remote from the harm for there to be 
liability. 
B. The Deep Pocket Jurisprudence Generator for Innovator Liability  
So, why would five courts, including a respected state supreme court, 
depart so far from hornbook tort law? The answer, in part, is deep pocket 
jurisprudence. In their rulings, some of these courts openly expressed 
concerns that users of generic drugs may not have sufficient or viable 
options for recovery if not allowed to sue the brand-name manufacturers.
33
  
The basis for this sentiment, at least for the three most recent rulings, 
was the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing.
34
 In 
Mensing, the Court ruled that federal drug law preempts state failure-to-
warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs.
35
 The Court found it 
would be impossible for a generic drug manufacturer to adhere to federal 
labeling law to issue the “same” warning as approved for the brand-name 
drug and change those warnings to cure defects a jury determines to exist in 
a state failure-to-warn suit.
36
 As a result, a user of generic drugs would be 
blocked from suing his or her drug’s manufacturer in many cases.  
By contrast, two years earlier in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court held 
that federal drug law does not preempt many comparable failure-to-warn 
claims against brand-name drug manufacturers.
37
 It reasoned that, unlike 
generic drug manufacturers, makers of brand-name drugs are allowed to 
add safety information in response to a jury’s failure-to-warn determination 
and then seek FDA approval for that change.
38
 Accordingly, a brand-name 
drug user can often move forward with failure-to-warn claims against the 
drug’s manufacturer. 
The tension between these divergent decisions did not go unnoticed. The 
Supreme Court accepted that it eliminated warning-based recoveries for 
users of generic drugs: “We recognize that from the perspective of 
[plaintiffs], finding pre-emption here but not in [Levine] makes little sense,” 
and “[w]e acknowledge the unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Dolin v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 62 F. Supp. 3d 705, 711-12 (N.D. Ill. 
2014); Novartis, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 777 n.2; Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 670 
(Ala. 2014). 
 34. 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
 35. Id. at 609 (“The question presented is whether federal drug regulations applicable to 
generic drug manufacturers directly conflict with, and thus pre-empt, these state-law claims. 
We hold that they do.”). 
 36. Id. at 620-21. 
 37. 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009). 
 38. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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has dealt” users of generic drugs with respect to failure-to-warn suits.
39
 The 
Mensing dissenters (Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) also 
highlighted the implications for users of generic drugs, cautioning that 
“whether a consumer harmed by inadequate warnings can obtain relief turns 
solely on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription 
with a brand-name or generic drug.”
40
  
The Mensing majority continued that the solution is for Congress to 
change FDA labeling laws so that preemption applies equally to users of 
generic and brand-name drugs.
41
 This is a federal law quandary with a 
federal law solution. Yet, a handful of courts have responded by giving 
users of generic drugs a path for recovery under state tort law: to sue the 
manufacturers of the corresponding brand-name drug under the common 
law tort of negligent misrepresentation, as discussed above. In their view, 
Mensing undermined cases rejecting innovator liability.
42
 After the Mensing 
Court held that federal law pre-empted state failure-to-warn suits against 
manufacturers of generic drugs, the courts argued that these other rulings 
were no longer valid because they were decided when consumers of generic 
drugs could obtain awards from the manufacturers of the drugs they took.
43
  
In the years since Mensing, innovator liability has remained the outlier 
view.
44
 Dozens of courts have now ruled on this issue; the response from 
almost all courts has been to apply traditional state product liability and tort 
law, even when doing so leads to unfortunate results for users of generic 
drugs.
45
 As these courts have explained, Mensing had nothing to do with 
whether innovator liability is a viable theory under state tort law, and they 
should not “contort” negligent misrepresentation theory to give users of 
generic drugs avenues for compensation.
46
 These courts appreciated that, 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Mensing, 564 U.S. at 625.  
 40. Id. at 627 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 621 (majority opinion).  
 42. See Dolin v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 62 F. Supp. 3d 705, 711-12 (N.D. Ill. 
2014); T.H. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 777 n.2 (Ct. App.), superseded by 
grant of review H.(T.) v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 371 P.3d 241 (Cal. 2016); Wyeth Inc. v. 
Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 670 (Ala. 2014).  
 43. See, e.g., Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 665 (marginalizing cases “issued before the Supreme 
Court decided PLIVA. Accordingly, the federal court’s conclusion . . . that a generic 
manufacturer becomes responsible for its own warning label after the ANDA process is 
incorrect.”). 
 44. See Beck & Herrmann, supra note 6.  
 45. See Schwartz et al., supra note 2. 
 46. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014). As one federal judge 
explained, “I cannot find that a decision to hold a manufacturer liable for injury caused by its 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/2
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regardless of whether one thinks Mensing is fair or unfair or whether users 
of generic drugs should or should not have paths to recovery, innovator 
liability should still find no support in common law torts. 
In fact, a closer look at Mensing supports this view. Before Mensing 
reached the Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s innovator liability claims.
47
 Thus, 
the Supreme Court issued its preemption ruling in Mensing in full light of 
an earlier denial of innovator liability and decided not to disturb that 
determination. After the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed that Mensing did not alter its ruling against innovator liability.
48
 
For these and other reasons, the Alabama Legislature overrode its state’s 
innovator liability ruling.
49
 In the legislative session immediately following 
the court’s ruling in Weeks, the Legislature passed a bill making it clear that 
a manufacturer can be subject to liability only for its own product even 
when its “design is copied or otherwise used by [another] manufacturer.”
50
 
Legislatures rarely override judicial rulings, and so it was important that 
this one was done with broad bipartisan support. The bill passed the 
Alabama Senate 32-0 and the House 86-14.
51
 This enactment has curbed 
momentum for innovator liability in the wake of Mensing. 
C. Innovator Liability, Like Other Attempts at Deep Pocket Jurisprudence, 
Lacks a Viable Limiting Principle 
As seen in these cases, a hallmark of deep pocket jurisprudence is the 
lack of any real limiting principle. A court engaging in such jurisprudence 
seeks to create liability despite the rational rule of law. Courts allowing 
innovator liability have suggested that federal drug law makes prescription 
                                                                                                                 
competitor’s product is rooted in common sense.” Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-6168-TC, 
2010 WL 2553619, at *2 (D. Or. May 28, 2010). 
 47. See Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d in pertinent part 
and vacated in part on other grounds, 658 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 48. In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mensing, the Eighth Circuit mistakenly 
vacated its entire judgment, not just the part affected by the high court’s decision. In 
response to a motion from the brand-name manufacturers to reinstate the part of its earlier 
ruling against competitor liability, the Eighth Circuit reinstated that part of the opinion. See 
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 658 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2011).  
 49. See PHIL GOLDBERG, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST., SHOWDOWN IN ALABAMA: 
LITIGATORS VS. INNOVATORS (PPI Policy Brief, Sept. 2015), http://www.progressivepolicy. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015.09-Goldberg_Showdown-in-Alabama-Litigators-vs-
Innovators.pdf. 
 50. ALA. CODE § 6-5-530(a) (2015). 
 51. GOLDBERG, supra note 49, at 2. 
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drugs unique and, therefore, innovator liability can be limited to drugs 
regulated by federal law. Tort history, though, has repeatedly demonstrated 
that once a court introduces a liability-expanding principle against one 
product or industry, it migrates to others. Future plaintiffs will argue that 
innovators of other products, not just pharmaceuticals, will be subject to 
liability for not warning about harms caused by products they did not make.  
In fact, in striking down innovator liability for prescription drugs, the 
Iowa Supreme Court identified this problem. It asked: “Where would such 
liability stop? If a car seat manufacturer recognized as an industry leader 
designed a popular car seat, could it be sued for injuries sustained by a 
consumer using a competitor’s seat that copied the design?”
52
 The scenarios 
where such allegations can be made are vast. What if a foreign company 
over which the U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction reverse engineers an 
American manufacturer’s product and sells it with identical packaging, 
instructions and warnings? What if, instead of FDA law creating the link 
between the innovator and subsequent generic product, federal patent law is 
used to link the two? Should anyone who files a patent and divulges the 
design of a product foresee that a consumer will be injured by a knock-off 
or modified version of its product, regardless of whether it is before or after 
the patent expires?  
In today’s economy, innovations are frequently copied. Some product 
copying is legal, as it is common to walk through a supermarket or 
drugstore aisle and find brand-name products side-by-side with store brand 
products listing the same ingredients and packaged to resemble the original. 
Other copying scenarios are not so legal. Foreign companies have a history 
of creating clones of many products, including Apple’s iPhones and iPods, 
Chevy automobiles, Nike and Reebok sneakers, Callaway golf clubs, Intel 
processors, and Duracell batteries.
53
 If innovator liability is allowed for 
pharmaceuticals, plaintiffs’ lawyers in these other contexts will argue that 
the pervasiveness of generic products, reverse engineering, and 
counterfeiting makes it foreseeable that other companies will replicate 
designs and that consumers will be hurt by these and other replicas. The 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014). 
 53. See Jacob Bogage, This Car Company Ripped Off Land Rover. Here’s Why It Might 
Get Away with It, WASH. POST (July 19, 2016) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/hp/2016/07/19/this-car-company-ripped-off-land-rover-heres-why-it-might-get-away-
with-it/?utm_term=.5b45c6547\da; Dan Koeppel, China’s iClone, POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 7, 
2007), http://www.popsci.com/iclone. 
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risk of this liability is not farfetched: some manufacturers have already 
received complaints about products they did not produce.
54
  
The practical complications of innovator liability would be felt by 
consumers, employees, and businesses alike. In many industries, innovator 
liability would spur multiple, potentially conflicting warnings. Some 
manufacturers might provide overly harsh warnings solely designed to 
reduce liability exposures. Other manufacturers may be more accurate or 
work with a government agency to identify a proper balance between actual 
risks and benefits. The resulting confusion would likely cause consumers to 
discount warnings and fuel the public’s contempt for warnings in general. 
For prescription drugs, courts have raised public health concerns with 
innovator liability. In today’s post-patent marketplace, generics quickly 
seize up to ninety percent of the market for a drug.
55
 A concern with 
saddling a company whose sales constitute ten percent of the market with 
one hundred percent of the liability is that people would have to pay higher 
prices for brand-name prescriptions during a drug’s period of exclusivity so 
the company could amass resources to pay anticipated innovator liability 
claims in the future. Further, it will be riskier for brand-name drug 
manufacturers to innovate important medicines, particularly when a drug 
may come with major side effects or is designed for small classes of 
patients and will not drive the large revenues needed to pay for claims 
involving generics. There are no therapeutic benefits to innovator liability.  
The civil justice system for prescription drugs should remain principled. 
Disproportionate liability is not an accurate measure of deterrence. If 
labeling or marketing practices overstate benefits or downplay risks, a 
brand-name manufacturer can be subject to significant liability already, as 
well as substantial civil fines. Brand-name and generic drugs may be 
bioequivalent, and federal and state law may encourage the availability of 
generic drugs, but that does not make brand-name manufacturers their 
competitors’ keepers. 
II. Deep Pocket Jurisprudence in Government Public Nuisance Litigation  
The effort to turn the tort of public nuisance into deep pocket 
jurisprudence for environmental and social risks and harms started in the 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See Koeppel, supra note 53.  
 55. See IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE 
UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF 2010, at 22 (Apr. 2011), https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/ 
imsH%20Institute/Reports/The%20Use%20of%20Medicines%20in%20the%20United%20S
tates%202010/Use_of_Meds_in_the_U.S._Review_of_2010.pdf. 
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 The goal of this movement has been to require businesses, rather 
than individual wrongdoers or taxpayers, to remediate environmental 
damage en masse or pay the costs of social harms, even when the business 
sued did not cause the harm alleged.
57
 As with innovator liability, there is 
no doctrinal support for creating such liability under traditional tort law. 
Plaintiffs can succeed only when courts issue end-game oriented rulings. 
The tort of public nuisance has roots in centuries-old English common 
law.
58
 It has always had a narrow purpose: to allow governments to use the 
tort system, rather than criminal or regulatory law, to stop someone from 
unlawfully interfering with a public right and to make that person repair any 
damage he or she has caused to the public right.
59
 Typical public nuisance 
suits seek to stop quasi-criminal conduct, including unlawfully blocking a 
public road or illegally dumping pollutants into a public river.
60
 The court 
can issue an injunction against the action causing the public nuisance and 
require the payment of abatement costs. 
In the late 1960s, when Dean Prosser was drafting the public nuisance 
chapters of the Restatement (Second), environmental lawyers sought to 
expand the types of conduct that could lead to public nuisance liability.
61
 
Instead of quasi-criminal conduct, they wanted public nuisance liability to 
attach to any conduct, even when fully lawful and regulated.
62
 This way, 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining 
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006). 
 57. See Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the 
Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 838 (2001).  
 58. See id. After the New Deal and growth of government regulation in the 1930s, 
public nuisance had become a fairly dormant tort in the United States. As a result, many 
judges were not familiar with its doctrinal roots and scholars conceded that because the term 
nuisance could mean “all things to all people” there was confusion over how the tort could 
be used. The environmentalists tried to leverage this confusion in seeking their changes in 
the Restatement (Second). See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 86, at 616 (“There is 
perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 
‘nuisance.’”). 
 59. In the absence of significant regulation, public nuisance became a substitute for 
governments that “could not anticipate and explicitly prohibit or regulate through legislation 
all the particular activities that might injure or annoy the general public.” Donald G. Gifford, 
Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 804 (2003). 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1979) 
(providing examples of public nuisances). 
 61. See id.; Antolini, supra note 57, at 838 (recounting in detail the specific 
developments in the 1960s and 1970s that could have led to “breaking the bounds of 
traditional public nuisance”) (citation omitted). 
 62. See Antolini, supra note 57, at 838. 
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manufacturers could face broad-based public nuisance liability whenever 
people created nuisances with their products. The environmental lawyers 
believed that suing the individual wrongdoers one-by-one would be 
inefficient, whereas the deep-pocketed manufacturer could address the issue 
on a macro scale.
63
 Public nuisance, however, has proven not to be so 
malleable. It is strictly an activity-based tort, not a manufacturing one. 
Thus, the person or entity who wrongfully blocks the roadway or dumps the 
chemicals is responsible for the public nuisance, not the manufacturer of the 
materials the wrongdoer used to create the public nuisance.
64
 
The first test case for expanding public nuisance theory was an effort to 
clean up smog in Los Angeles in the 1970s. Plaintiffs sued dozens of 
companies whose activities and products caused the smog.
65
 The purpose of 
this suit was to regulate emissions through tort liability, however, and was 
not necessarily deep pocket jurisprudence as defined in this article. In 
dismissing the lawsuit, the California Court of Appeal explained that there 
is a “system of statutes and administrative rules” that govern emissions in 
this country and that engaging in lawful commerce cannot be re-categorized 
as tortious conduct, even when contributing to a public nuisance.
66
 This 
case reinforced the traditional understanding of public nuisance theory.
67
 
The deep pocket jurisprudence variant of public nuisance litigation 
became evident in a high-profile water pollution case in New York during 
the 1980s. A defunct waste management firm had illegally dumped 
materials into a river years earlier, and the school board that owned the 
property in the 1980s did not have the resources to clean it up.
68
 The local 
government sued the company that contracted with the polluter in the 1950s 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Dean Prosser wrote in 1966 that “[a] public or ‘common’ nuisance is always a 
crime. . . . a species of catch-all low-grade criminal offense, consisting of an interference 
with the rights of the community at large, which may include anything from the blocking of 
a highway to a gaming-house or indecent exposure.” William L. Prosser, Private Action for 
Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 997-99 (1966). 
 64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. B. Examples of public 
nuisances include storing explosives in a city, interfering with reasonable community noise 
levels, and interfering with breathable air by emitting noxious odors into a public area. See 
id. 
 65. Diamond v. Gen. Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641 (Ct. App. 1971). 
 66. Id. at 645. Plaintiffs were “asking the court to do what the elected representatives of 
the people have not done: adopt stricter standards over the discharge of air contaminants in 
this country, and enforce them with the contempt power of court.” Id.  
 67. The court also rejected the ability of private citizens to bring a public nuisance claim 
seeking injunctive relief and the use of public nuisance class actions. Id. at 642-44. 
 68. State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (Sup. Ct. 1983), aff’d, 
State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1984). 
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and 1960s to dispose of the waste that was dumped unlawfully into the 
river.
69
 This company, though, did not engage in the act of polluting the 
waterway, never owned or controlled the land where the pollution took 
place, and did not know of the illegal dumping.
70
 Nonetheless, after 
acknowledging the doctrinal and factual shortcomings of this lawsuit, the 
court allowed the claim to proceed with the surprising and open-ended 
observation that “[s]omeone must pay to correct the problem.”
71
 
Since the 1980s, there have been several more completely overt attempts 
at deep pocket public nuisance jurisprudence. These cases did not focus on 
a discrete site or incidence of harm, but on subjecting manufacturers or 
entire industries to paying the costs associated with the way people use, 
misuse, or dispose of products.  
Allowing such broad-based liability requires courts to change core 
elements of public nuisance theory. For example, some suits have attempted 
to get rid of the requirement that the alleged injury be to a public right, 
arguing that only a public interest need be involved or that an aggregation 
of private rights is equivalent to a public right.
72
 Other suits have alleged 
that government public nuisance suits, because of their broad-based nature, 
should not require proximate cause between any defendant’s conduct and a 
specific public nuisance; rather, they argue that any generalized 
contribution to the risk of harm should be sufficient to create liability.
73
 
These attempts to change the tort of public nuisance have largely failed 
because they are out-of-step with essential characteristics of the tort.
74
 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id.  
 70. See id. at 976 (adhering to the expansive definition of “nuisance” as “no more than 
harm, injury, inconvenience, or annoyance” (quoting Copart Indus. v. Consol. Edison Co. of 
N.Y., Inc., 362 N.E.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. 1977)). 
 71. Id. at 977. 
 72.  
That which might benefit (or harm) “the public interest” is a far broader 
category than that which actually violates “a public right.” For example, while 
promoting the economy may be in the public interest, there is no public right to 
a certain standard of living (or even a private right to hold a job). Similarly, 
while it is in the public interest to promote the health and well-being of citizens 
generally, there is no common law public right to a certain standard of medical 
care or housing. 
Gifford, supra note 59, at 815-16. 
 73. See, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 
N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005), superseded by statute, S.B. 1, 2011, as stated in Clark v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., No. 06CV12653, 2015 WL 1257118 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 25, 2014).  
 74. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 56, at 561-70. 
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A. Suing Product Manufacturers for Harms Caused by Others 
A significant shift in these cases started in the 1990s when governments, 
with the aid and encouragement of private contingency fee lawyers, began 
suing product manufacturers for environmental and social harms associated 
with the use, misuse, or disposal of products.
75
 For example, gun 
manufacturers were sued over criminal gun violence, and former 
manufacturers of lead paint were sued when landlords allowed the paint to 
deteriorate and become hazardous.
76
 Rather than sue the individual 
tortfeasors, namely the criminals or slumlords in these examples, the 
governments targeted the manufacturers of products that the wrongdoers 
used to create the environmental or social harm. The argument was not that 
the products were defective, but that the manufacturers that made money 
from selling the products should have to pay their share to remediate the 
harms caused by them.
77
 The governments wanted the products’ prices to 
incorporate their “true” cost to society.
78
  
If liable under these theories, manufacturers could be responsible for 
abating public nuisances around the country, often with few defenses. The 
traditional tenets of product liability and tort law, including the lack of a 
manufacturer’s wrongdoing, a product’s utility, the overall public interest, 
and the lapse of time since the product was lawfully made and sold, would 
take a back seat to this desire for a new, deep-pocketed revenue source. 
1. Suing Firearm Manufacturers for Criminal Gun Violence 
The first widespread effort to expand public nuisance litigation to pay 
costs of a social harm was municipal litigation against firearm 
manufacturers over criminal gun violence.
79
 The governments generally 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Can Governments Impose a New Tort Duty to Prevent 
External Risks? The “No-Fault” Theories Behind Today’s High-Stakes Government 
Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923 (2009). 
 76. See, e.g., Miller v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 502, 509-10 (W.D. La. 
2001) (treated lumber); Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 973 (E.D. Tex. 
1997) (tobacco); E.S. Robbins Corp. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 912 F. Supp. 1476, 1494 (N.D. 
Ala. 1995) (chemicals); Johnson Cty., Tenn. ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of Tenn. v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co. 580 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), set aside on other grounds, Johnson Cty., 
Tenn. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 664 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (asbestos); City of St. 
Louis v. Cernicek, 145 S.W.3d 37, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (firearms); DiCarlo v. Ford 
Motor Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 417 (App. Div. 1978) (auto manufacturers). 
 77. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 78. See infra Section II.A.1.  
 79. Professor David Kairys of the Beasley School of Law worked with cities to file 
public-nuisance claims against gun manufacturers. See David Kairys, The Origin and 
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alleged that it was foreseeable to the manufacturers “that their conduct will 
cause handguns to be used and possessed illegally and that such conduct 
produces an ongoing nuisance that has a detrimental effect upon the public 
health, safety, and welfare of the residents.”
80
 Accordingly, the 
governments alleged, manufacturers should reimburse governments for the 
“costs of enforcing the law, arming the police force, treating the victims of 
handgun crimes, implementing social service programs, and improving the 
social and economic climate” in the individual municipalities.
81 
A few courts initially accepted this novel view of public nuisance 
theory.
82
 In City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., the Indiana Supreme 
Court recognized that it was acting without precedent in allowing the claim 
to proceed.
83
 It held that a public nuisance could be an activity that injures 
or inconveniences others that is grave and foreseeable, regardless of 
whether a public right is violated or the defendant’s conduct was 
unreasonable.
84
 According to the court, the victims should be compensated 
in order for the activity to continue. “If the marketplace values the product 




                                                                                                                 
Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2000) 
(stating that although tobacco public-nuisance claims “never [won] in court,” they were a 
“vehicle for settlement” and a model for gun suits). 
 80. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2380, 
768 N.E.2d 1136, at ¶ 7, superseded by statute as stated in City of Toledo v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., No. Cl 200606040, 2007 WL 4965044 (Ohio Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 2007). 
 81. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 115 (Conn. 2001). 
 82. See City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 (Ind. 2003) 
(allowing a public-nuisance claim to proceed); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 
Ohio St. 2d 416, at ¶¶ 12-16, 768 N.E.2d at 1143–44 (allowing a public-nuisance claim to 
proceed). But see City of Phila. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(dismissing public-nuisance claims under Pennsylvania law); Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen 
Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3d Cir. 2001) (same under New 
Jersey law); City of Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (same 
under Illinois law); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 203 
(App. Div. 2003) (same under New York law); Ganim, 780 A.2d at 133 (same under 
Connecticut law); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (same under Florida law). 
 83. 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 (Ind. 2003) (“We are not persuaded that a public nuisance 
necessarily involves either an unlawful activity or the use of land. Defendants cite no 
Indiana case that establishes this requirement, but point out that all Indiana cases to date 
have fallen into one of these two categories. We think that is due to the happenstance of how 
the particular public nuisance actions arose and not to any principle of law.”). 
 84. Id. at 1231. 
 85. Id. at 1234. 
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In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth the majority view in a 
pair of lawsuits, one brought by the City of Chicago and the other by 
private plaintiffs.
86
 The Court performed a full doctrinal analysis of public 
nuisance theory, looking at the elements and standards of proof that public 
and private plaintiffs must satisfy to bring a claim.
87
 In dismissing the suits, 
the court reinforced the requirement that a public right must be implicated, 
stating that the “right to be free from the threat that members of the public 
may commit crimes against individuals” was not a public right.
88
 It may be 
a personal right or an issue of public concern, but not the kind of public 
right that public nuisance theory was intended to enforce. The court also 
held that balancing the harm and utility of guns is a policy question for the 
legislature, not the courts.
89
 Lawfully selling a product is not an activity 
within traditional boundaries of public nuisance theory.
90
 
Many courts also expressed concerns with the lack of a limiting principle 
for this new liability. As one court concluded, if the mere existence of a 
public nuisance gave rise to these actions, any number of product liability 
actions could be converted into public nuisance suits.
91
 Said another: 
All a creative mind would need to do is construct a scenario 
describing a known or perceived harm of a sort that can 
somehow be said to relate back to the way a company or 
industry makes, markets and/or sells its non-defective, lawful 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1112 (dismissing public nuisance claim by 
public plaintiff under the fact pleading standard that the “court must disregard the 
conclusions that are pleaded and look only to well-pleaded facts to determine whether they 
are sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendant”); see also Young v. Bryco 
Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill. 2004) (dismissing public nuisance claim by private 
plaintiffs). 
 87. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1110-12.  
 88. Id. at 1114-16 (“We are also reluctant to recognize a public right so broad and 
undefined that the presence of any potentially dangerous instrumentality in the community 
could be deemed to threaten it.”); see also Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that under New Jersey law, 
“the scope of nuisance claims has been limited to interference connected with real property 
or infringement of public rights”). 
 89. See Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1121 (“We are reluctant to interfere in the 
lawmaking process in the manner suggested by plaintiffs, especially when the product at 
issue is already so heavily regulated by both the state and federal governments.”). 
 90. See id. at 1117-18. 
 91. See Cty. of Johnson v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). 
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product or service, and a public nuisance claim would be 
conceived and a lawsuit born.
92
 
A third stated that a finding of liability based on whether a product was 
used by criminals would be “staggering.”
93
  
The firearms litigation largely subsided by 2005, but it was revived in 
the aftermath of the horrific 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary 
School in Connecticut when families of the victims sued the manufacturers 
of guns used in the assault.
94
 The lawsuit did not involve public nuisance 
theory, but the tort of negligent entrustment.
95
 As the Connecticut Superior 
Court made clear in rejecting the claim, manufacturers are also not subject 
to liability under negligent entrustment theory for criminal acts committed 
by others using their guns.
96
 Here, the manufacturers did not entrust the 
teenage shooter in Connecticut with any firearms; he obtained the guns 
from his mother, who he also shot and killed.
97
 Because neither mother nor 
son could compensate the plaintiffs, the families pursued the manufacturers 
to pay for their losses. As of this writing, the case remains under review by 
the Connecticut Supreme Court.
98
 
2. Suing Former Manufacturers of Lead Pigment and Paint for Lead 
Poisoning 
Another long-running attempt at deep pocket public nuisance 
jurisprudence has been the twenty-year attempt to force former lead 
pigment and paint manufacturers to pay the cost of abating lead paint from 
older homes. The use of white lead pigment in interior paints was largely 
                                                                                                                 
 92. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (App. Div. 
2003). 
 93. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 370 F.3d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 2004) (Callahan, J., dissenting); see 
also Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. #15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(noting that to hold otherwise would “give rise to a cause of action . . . regardless of the 
defendant’s degree of culpability or of the availability of other traditional tort law theories of 
recovery”). 
 94. See Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, FBTCV156048103S, 2016 WL 
8115354 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016).  
 95. See id. at *3-4.  
 96. See id. at *5-10 (“The court does not agree with the plaintiffs’ assertion that the 
common law recognizes a class as broad as civilians to support a claim for negligent 
entrustment.”). 
 97. Id. at *1. 
 98. See Dave Altimari, Sandy Hook Gun Case to Be Heard by Reconfigured Supreme 
Court, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-
news-sandy-hook-gun-case-20171019-story.html. 
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discontinued in the 1950s.
99
 When lead-based paint applied before then 
deteriorated from poor maintenance in later years, it became a health hazard 
for children who ingested the flaking paint chips.
100
 Since the 1970s, many 
local governments have put in place strict laws requiring landlords to 
maintain lead-safe housing units and social programs to reduce lead 
poisoning.
101
 These efforts have worked, as communities from Maryland to 
California have seen significant reductions in lead poisoning from paint, 




The lawsuits against the former manufacturers were initiated in the late 
1990s by the nationally known law firm Motley Rice, which partnered with 
state and local governments in the litigation. Their first suit was filed on 
behalf of Rhode Island for the costs of abating lead paint in homes 
throughout the state, which was estimated to cost $4 billion.
103
 The trial 
court diluted the standards of proof needed to succeed, leading to a verdict 
for the state.
104
 Rather than requiring a violation of a public right, the court 
allowed liability to be based solely on allegations related to private 
residences.
105
 As in the gun cases, the court did not require the defendants’ 
conduct to be unreasonable; rather, the court relied on the notion that it 
would be unreasonable for the children to have to bear the cost of their 
injuries.
106
 Finally, the court vitiated the proximate cause requirement, 
instructing the jury that it “need not find that lead pigment manufactured by 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 2004-63-MP 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2004), 2004 RI S. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 4, *8; Edward Fitzpatrick, 
Paint Maker Seeks Ruling on Judge in Lead Case, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 19, 2005, at B1. 
 100. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830, at *6 (R.I. 
Super. Apr. 2, 2001). It is widely accepted that when the paint is allowed to crack or peel, 
children ingesting the paint chips can contract lead poisoning, which can impair cognitive 
function, stunt growth, and lead to behavioral problems. See In re Lead Paint, No. MID-L-
2754-01, 2002 WL 31474528, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2002). 
 101. See DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES: 
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION 114-15 (2010) (providing 
citations to successful laws and studies reporting on the reduction in elevated blood lead 
levels in those cities and states). 
 102. See id. at 115.  
 103. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 99.  
 104. See Peter B. Lord, 3 Companies Found Liable in Lead-Paint Nuisance Suit, 
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 23, 2006, at A1. 
 105. See Peter B. Lord, Lead-Paint Case Now in Jury’s Hands, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 14, 
2006, at B2 (quoting Judge Michael A. Silverstein). 
 106. Jury Instructions, State v. Atl. Richfield Co., C.A. No. 99-5226, 1999 Jury Instr. 
LEXIS 17 at *12 (R.I. Super. Jan. 1, 1999). 
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the Defendants, or any of them, is present in particular properties in Rhode 
Island.”
107
 In an interview after the case, a juror said that the jury did not 
want to find in favor of the plaintiffs, but the jury instructions “didn’t give 
the paint companies much of a window to crawl through.”
108
 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court overturned this ruling.
109
 It found that 
“public nuisance law simply does not provide a remedy for this harm” and 
affirmed that “[t]he law of public nuisance never before has been applied to 
products, however harmful.”
110
 The New Jersey Supreme Court further 
explained that allowing the claims “would stretch the concept of public 
nuisance far beyond recognition and would create a new and entirely 
unbounded tort antithetical to the meaning and inherent theoretical 
limitations of the tort of public nuisance.”
111
 As a result, “merely offering 
an everyday household product for sale can suffice for the purpose of 
interfering with a common right as we understand it. Such an interpretation 
would far exceed any cognizable cause of action.”
112
 The Missouri Supreme 
Court further explained that bringing private claims in the name of the 
government would not lower liability standards to allow such litigation.
113
 
After these verdicts, most pending lead paint suits were dismissed or 
withdrawn.
114
 The only remaining suit is in California, where the trial judge 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. at *17. 
 108. See Peter Krouse, Verdict Raises Risk for Paint Companies, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 2, 
2006, at A1. 
 109. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008); see also City of St. Louis 
v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 112–13 (Mo. 2007); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 
A.2d 484, 487 (N.J. 2007); City of Toledo v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. G-4801-CI-
200606040-000 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 12, 2007); City of Chi. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 
N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Thus far, public-nuisance claims in Wisconsin and 
California have survived initial appeal. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 313 (Ct. App. 2006); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 2005 WI App 7, 278 
Wis. 2d 313, 691 N.W.2d 888. 
 110. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 435, 456. 
 111. Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 494. 
 112. Id. at 501.  
 113. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d at 113. 
 114. Within a week of the Rhode Island ruling, Columbus, Ohio voluntarily dismissed its 
public nuisance suit against lead paint manufacturers. See Columbus Drops Nuisance Suit 
over Lead Paint, DAYTON BUS. J. (July 10, 2008), https://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/ 
stories/2008/07/07/daily30.html; Mark Ferenchik, City Drops Lead-Paint Suit: Court 
Rulings Elsewhere Lead to Decision; Ohio Will Pursue Its Case, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 
10, 2008, at 1B; Paintmakers Win Public Nuisance Appeal; Columbus Drops Its Suit, CHEM. 
WK. July 14, 2008, at 4. In 2009, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray dismissed the 
State’s final public nuisance suit against the lead paint manufacturers. General Cordray 
stated in his press release: “I understand and strongly agree that exposure to lead paint is a 
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endorsed legal work-arounds similar to those rejected in the other states.
115
 
For example, when the plaintiffs could not show that the defendants acted 
wrongfully when lead-based paint was sold, the court changed the test and 
applied a “contemporary knowledge” standard.
116
 The court made clear its 
deep pocket objective, stating that it did not want to “turn a blind eye to the 
existing problem” of lead poisoning, it was trying to “protect thousands of 
lives,” and the former manufacturers should have to give the governments 
the “resources to effectively deal with the problem.”
117
 In a bench trial, the 
judge found against the manufacturers for $1.15 billion in abatement 
costs.
118
 In 2014, the case was sent to a California Court of Appeal, which 
issued a decision largely endorsing the lower court’s rulings the week this 
article was sent to publication.
119
 The companies have already expressed 
their intent to appeal the case to the California Supreme Court.
120
 
B. Today’s New Wave of Deep Pocket Public Nuisance Cases 
In the past two years, two new major deep pocket public nuisance 
initiatives have been launched. The first set of cases, which is reminiscent 
of the New York court’s insistence that someone must pay to clean up a 
waterway, targets Monsanto in an effort to abate polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs) in certain bodies of water. When Monsanto was a chemical 
company, it manufactured PCBs. It generally sold PCBs to other 
                                                                                                                 
very real problem. . . . But I also know that not every problem can be solved by a lawsuit.” 
Julie Zeveloff, New Ohio AG Drops Suit Against Lead Paint Cos., LAW 360 (Feb. 6, 2009), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/86432. 
 115. For example, the trial court eliminated the bedrock tort law requirement that a 
person can be liable only for harms that he or she caused. The trial court stated that 
defendants could be liable without requiring plaintiffs to “identify the specific location of 
the nuisance or a specific product sold by each such Defendant.” People v. Atl. Richfield 
Co., No. 100CV788657, 2014 WL 1385823, at *44 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014). The 
court made a causation ruling solely on the fact that defendants’ products could be in 
California homes. Id. at *18. The trial court then held defendants jointly and severally liable 
to bypass the need to identify which properties, if any, have a company’s lead-based paint. 
Id. at *62. 
 116. Id. at *54.  
 117. Id. at *52-53. 
 118. Id. at *61.  
 119. People v. Conagra Grocery Prods. Co., No. H040880, 2017 WL 5437485 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 14, 2017). 
 120. See Michael Hiltzik, In Landmark Ruling, Court Orders Paint Companies to Pay to 
Clean Lead Paint Out of California Homes, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2017, http://www.latimes. 
com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-lead-paint-ruling-20171115-story.html (“The defendant 
paint companies say they’ll appeal the ruling to the California Supreme Court.”). 
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manufacturers and did not take part in disposing the chemicals after they 
were sold. The second set of cases, like the firearm cases discussed above, 
seek to subject pharmaceutical companies and their downstream business 
partners to liability for the impact of opioid addiction. 
1. PCB Public Nuisance Litigation 
Monsanto manufactured PCBs from the 1930s through the 1970s as a 
component part for a variety of products.
121
 They were stable chemicals, 
resistant to extreme temperature and pressure.
122
 PCBs were used widely as 
insulators in high voltage applications, such as in capacitors and 
transformers, and were added to paint mixtures and other construction 
materials as fire retardants.
123
 As the component part supplier of PCBs, 
Monsanto did not control the other companies’ final products, where those 
products were sold, or how they were disposed. PCBs were banned in the 
late 1970s because of their potential environmental hazards.
124
 
In 2015, the Texas-based law firm Baron & Budd started teaming with 
cities and states along the West Coast to bring public nuisance lawsuits 
against Monsanto to remediate PCBs that ended up in waterways after 
being disposed in landfills and other places.
125
 Storm water picked up the 
PCBs from the landfills, flowed through municipal storm water collection 
systems, and was discharged into large bodies of water.
126
 The governments 
filing these suits include the municipalities of San Diego, San Jose, 
Oakland, Berkeley, Portland, Spokane, and Seattle, along with the State of 
Washington.
127
 All allege Monsanto should be subject to public nuisance 
liability because they made PCBs despite knowing they “were toxic to 
humans and wildlife and had spread throughout the ecosystem.”
128
 In 
August 2016, the suits filed by San Jose, Oakland, and Berkeley were 
dismissed for lack of standing; the federal judge held that the cities did not 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Questions About Products of the Former Monsanto, MONSANTO (Apr. 25, 
2017), https://monsanto.com/company/history/articles/former-monsanto-products/. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1976). 
 125. John Breslin, West Coast ‘Super Tort’ Against Monsanto Could Spread to Other 
States, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2017/01/11/ 
west-coast-super-tort-against-monsanto-could-spread-to-other-states/#61da5db176. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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have the requisite property interest in storm water or the San Francisco Bay 
to bring a claim.
129
 The water here was not the cities’ to protect.  
Within weeks, the California Legislature enacted two laws aimed at 
laying the foundation for these suits. The first law stated that a “public 
entity that captures storm water . . . shall be entitled to use the captured 
water.”
130
 The second law included a provision giving cities authority to sue 
over public nuisances on properties entrusted to them by the state.
131
 
Shortly thereafter, the cities refiled their complaints, citing their new 
property rights to the storm water and the authority to bring this type of 
public nuisance action. 
In another lawsuit, a federal judge in Washington denied Monsanto’s 
motion to dismiss Spokane’s allegations of PCB contamination of its storm 
water.
132
 The court’s ruling diverted from traditional public nuisance theory 
in three ways. First, it held that the “nuisance is an act or omission that 
causes a specific type of injury, not the fact of the injury itself.”
133
 
Traditionally, the public nuisance is the condition affecting the public right; 
deciding who is responsible for the nuisance requires examining the 
wrongful conduct that caused the nuisance.
134
 Second, the court held that 
the nuisance is the “production, marketing, and distribution” of PCBs.
135
 
These issues, though, should sound solely in product liability, not public 
nuisance. Third, it held that a manufacturer can be subject to liability for a 
public nuisance “regardless of the intervening actions by consumers” so 
long as the future contamination was “at least arguably foreseeable.”
136
 
Shortly thereafter, the State of Washington filed its own public nuisance 
suit, echoing the familiar deep pocket jurisprudence refrain that the 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Order Granting Motions to Dismiss, City of San Jose v. Monsanto, No. 5:15-cv-
03178-EJD, 2016 WL 4427492, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016). 
 130. Assem. B. 2594, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 131. See Sen. B. 859, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 132. See City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., No. 2.15-CV-00201-SMJ, 2016 WL 6275164 
(E.D. Wash. 2016). 
 133. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim, Id. at *19 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2016). 
 134. The Restatement (Second) of Torts envisions that if the conduct of a manufacturer 
“is not of a kind that subjects him to liability . . . the nuisance exists, but he is not liable for 
it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1979). 
 135. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim, City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., No. 2:15-CV-00201-SMJ, 2016 
WL 6275164, at *20 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2016). 
 136. Id. at *8. 
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company that made the chemicals should share the costs “as we clean up 
hundreds of contaminated sites and waterways around the state.”
137
 
If allowed, this legal theory could be applied to any chemical. It would 
be irrelevant whether the manufacturer engaged in wrongdoing or that 
decades passed since the manufacturer stopped making and selling the 
product.
138
 Further, the tortfeasors that engaged in the wrongdoing by not 
disposing their PCB-containing materials properly are not held accountable 
at all.  
It was in part because of these problems that Congress enacted the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) in 1980.
139
 This law provides statutory authority for the 
government to identify potentially responsible parties and require them to 
pay a share of the clean-up costs.
140
 This authority, though, does not exist 
under government public nuisance theory. 
2. Opioid Public Nuisance Litigation  
A rapidly growing series of lawsuits, which originated as public nuisance 
claims, involves governments suing pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
distributors, and pharmacies over the costs associated with treating and 
fighting prescription opioid abuse in their communities. Prescribing 
practices for opioids were liberalized in the 1990s to relieve undertreated 
pain, but, in the past few years, opioid addiction and abuse has become a 
national concern. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention found that 
33,000 people died in 2015 from opioid overdoses, with multiple 
communities stating that opioid addiction has become pervasive in their 
areas.
141
 Several years ago, individuals brought personal injury or wrongful 
death claims against many of the manufacturers of opioids, but courts 
concluded that responsibility for prescription drug abuse largely rested with 
the physicians who overprescribed the painkillers and the individuals who 
took the drugs, many of which were obtained illegally.
142
 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Ashley Stewart, Washington State Sues Monsanto over PCB Contamination, PUGET 
SOUND BUS. J. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2016/12/08/wash 
ington-state-monsanto-lawsuit-pcb-chemicals.html. 
 138. See Peter Hayes, Is the Public Nuisance Universe Expanding?, BLOOMBERG BNA 
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.bna.com/public-nuisance-universe-n57982083122/. 
 139. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See Opioid Overdose, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/ (last updated Sept. 26, 2017). 
 142. In Philadelphia, when a plaintiff’s lawyer in a wrongful death case against an opioid 
manufacturer presented on the problem of opioid abuse, the judge for the Court of Common 
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In reframing opioid litigation under government public nuisance theory, 
lawyers are echoing themes of the early litigation against firearm 
manufacturers in hopes of circumventing the responsibility of individual 
wrongdoers. They are seeking to blame the deep-pocketed prescription drug 
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies for generating a marketplace in 
which opioid addiction could arise. The lawsuits often do not provide 
specific factual allegations of tortious conduct; rather, they rely on general 
notions of wrongdoing to create industry culpability in the minds of the 
public.
143
 Richard Scruggs, a renowned former plaintiffs’ attorney, 
explained this tactic in an analytical piece on opioid litigation. Scruggs 
suggests the legal theories most likely to resonate are those that “do not 
hinge on fault,” but seek equitable types of relief based on the fact that 
these entities made money selling opioids.
144
  
The initial wave of opioid public nuisance suits targeted the drugs’ 
manufacturers. In 2014, the first lawsuits were filed by Orange and Santa 
Clara Counties in California.
145
 The suits claimed the manufacturers caused 
the public nuisance of opioid addiction by generating demand for opioids 
through misrepresenting the long-term risks of addiction to these drugs. In 
2015, a judge put the cases on hold on jurisdictional grounds, finding that 
the FDA had primary jurisdiction because the claims focused on the safety, 
                                                                                                                 
Pleas responded: “Find some legal arguments for me.” Max Mitchell, Can Opiate Litigation 
Ever Be the New Mass Tort?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202782732124; see also Dani Kass, 
Mich. Doctor Charged with Prescribing Unnecessary Opioids, LAW360 (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/955743/mich-doctor-charged-with-prescribing-
unnecessary-opioids (explaining how physicians and their assistants developed a scheme to 
overprescribe opioids). 
 143. For example, Suffolk and Broome Counties in New York sued opioid manufacturers 
alleging that their “deceptive marking” of opioids created the public nuisance of addiction. 
The lawsuit also alleged violations of New York’s Consumer Protection Act and common 
law fraud. The injuries the countries allege are the costs incurred from opioid abuse, such as 
health care, criminal justice and victimization, as well as lost productivity. See Dan 
Goldberg, Erie, Broome, Suffolk Sue Pharma Companies Over Opioid Epidemic, POLITICO 
(Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2017/02/erie-
broome-suffolk-sue-pharma-companies-over-opioid-epidemic-109492. 
 144. See Richard Scruggs, Are Opioids the New Tobacco?, LAW360 (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/962715. He said that fault is “not important” and that the 
states should focus “only who should pay as between the general public and the industry 
whose otherwise legal products caused the epidemic.” Id. 
 145. See Scott Glover & Lisa Girion, Counties Sue Narcotics Makers, Alleging 
‘Campaign of Deception’, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-
rx-big-pharma-suit-20140522-story.html. 
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efficacy, and labeling of opioids.
146
 A number of similar suits were soon 
filed around the country. For example, Everett, Washington sued the 
manufacturer of OxyContin, saying the company had turned a “blind eye” 
to criminal trafficking of its pills.
147
 Everett also expanded the scope of the 
actions, seeking to force OxyContin’s manufacturer to cover the cost of 
treating and fighting heroin addiction as well, relying on the somewhat 
ironic argument that opioid users switched to heroin when OxyContin was 
reformulated to be more difficult to abuse.
148
  
There also has been an effort to include distributors and pharmacies in 
the litigation. In February 2016, West Virginia filed a public nuisance 
action against McKesson Corporation, the main distributor of opioids.
149
 
Since then, several municipalities and counties in West Virginia filed their 
own, separate public nuisance actions against multiple distributors, as well 
as several large pharmacy chains. These suits seek damages for both opioid 
addiction and the larger problem of heroin abuse.
150
 The Cherokee Indian 
Tribe filed a similar suit in its own tribal court.
151
 These lawsuits generally 
claim that distributors and pharmacies should reimburse the governments 
for the costs related to drug abuse because the companies failed to secure 
the drug’s distribution chain from the “diversion” of opioids into an illicit 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See Lisa Girion, Judge Halts Counties’ Lawsuit Against 5 Narcotic Drug 
Manufacturers, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-
pharma-20150828-story.html. 
 147. See Harriet Ryan, Washington City Sues OxyContin Drugmaker, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
20, 2017, at 1. 
 148. See Dani Kass, Mass. Opioid Substitution Law a Nice Idea, but Falls Short, 
LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/958803/mass-opioid-
substitution-law-a-nice-idea-but-falls-short (explaining that Massachusetts, Maryland, 
Florida and West Virginia have enacted laws to make opioid medications harder to 
manipulate or crush in ways that they can be snorted). 
 149. See West Virginia v. McKesson Corp., No. 16-cv-01772, 2016 WL 843443 (S.D. 
W. Va. Feb. 23, 2016). 
 150. See id. (alleging, for example, that McKesson Corp., the main distributor of opioids, 
negligently distributed more than 1.2 million doses of opioids to a West Virginia county 
with a population of under 25,000 people and did not follow its obligation to investigate 
suspicious orders). 
 151. First Amended Petition at 2, Cherokee Nation v. McKesson, CV-2017-203 
(Cherokee Nation Dist. Ct. July 19, 2017) (“As a result, unauthorized opioid users in and 
around Cherokee Nation have ready access to illicit sources of diverted opioids.”). The 
defendants are seeking a preliminary injunction against the lawsuit in federal court, saying 
that the tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over actions by non-Indians outside of Indian 
County. See Christin Powell, McKesson, CVS Look to Toss, Pause Cherokee Opioid Suit, 
LAW360 (June 13, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/934235/mckesson-cvs-look-to-
toss-pause-cherokee-opioid-suit. 
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black market. For example, the West Virginia action against McKesson 
alleges that McKesson should have been able to stop 1.2 million doses of 




The allegations against the distributors and pharmacies, though, rest 
entirely on generalized notions; none of the pleadings identify any order 
shipped from a distributor or filled at a pharmacy that was illegal or even 
improper. To the contrary, seventy percent of the people who abuse 
prescription pain relievers obtain them from friends or relatives who 
purchased them legally.
153
 In an effort to create culpability, the lawsuits 
pointed to “voluntary duties” they say the companies adopted as part of 
their general statements against opioid abuse, as well as potential violations 
of the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) and other government reporting and 
regulatory requirements. As indicated above, these allegations are meant to 
create media attention and culpability in the minds of the public. 
To be clear, these allegations of wrongdoing have nothing to do with tort 
liability.
154
 The CSA does not have a private cause of action, and its 
standards are intentionally vague to facilitate better reporting. For instance, 
the CSA requires companies to report “suspicious” orders or orders of 
“unusual” size or frequency,
155
 terms that courts have found are not 
sufficiently well-defined to create notice for liability purposes.
156
 Thus, a 
CSA violation, even if it occurs, may give rise to a government 
enforcement action and fines, but not liability for all opioid addiction.
157
 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 26, McKesson (No. 16-cv-01772). 
 153. See Policy Impact: Prescription Painkiller Overdoses, NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL (November 2011), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/ 
pdf/PolicyImpact-PrescriptionPainkillerOD-a.pdf.  
 154. First Amended Petition, supra note 151, at 29, 39 (alleging the defendants “have 
voluntarily undertaken a duty to protect the public at large against diversions from their 
supply chains, and to curb the opioid epidemic”). 
 155. See Prescription Drugs: More DEA Information About Registrants’ Controlled 
Substances Roles Could Improve Their Understanding and Help Ensure Access, Food Drug 
Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 400,076, at 28-29, 67 (June 25, 2016), 2015 WL 7796261 (reporting 
that DEA has acknowledged that “short of providing arbitrary thresholds to distributors, it 
cannot provide more specific suspicious orders guidance because the variables that indicate a 
suspicious order differ among distributors and their customers”). 
 156. See, e.g., Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1999) (violation of 
statutory requirement that “does not itself articulate a standard of care but rather requires 
only . . . a report for the administration of a more general underlying standard . . . is not a 
breach of a standard of care”). 
 157. See Jeff Overley, What Attys Need to Know About Trump’s Opioid Policies, 
LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/952132/what-attys-need-to-know-
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There is no common law duty under tort law to monitor a product, 
including a prescription drug, after it is sold. Further, when a pharmacy has 
sought to question a prescription, it has been accused by physicians of 
“inappropriate interference with the practice of medicine,” and has faced 




The momentum for industry-wide opioid litigation picked up steam in 
May 2017, when Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine retained outside 
counsel to sue five opioid manufacturers. In June 2017, several state 
attorneys general joined together to launch an investigation into how the 
manufacturers might have contributed to the opioid epidemic. The stated 
goal of this investigation is “to determine whether the manufacturers and 
distributors have contributed to the opioid crisis,” but several additional 
state, county and municipal lawsuits are being filed before any such 
determinations are made.
159
 Kentucky Attorney General Andy Beshear, a 
member of this coalition, has already announced that he intends to file 
“multiple lawsuits” over the role drugmakers might have played in 
furthering the epidemic.
160
 Elsewhere, as in West Virginia, these lawsuits 
are being brought by states, counties, and municipalities, sometimes with 
overlapping jurisdictions. There are now more than sixty opioid lawsuits 
around the country, with each aimed at some combination of the twenty or 
                                                                                                                 
about-trump-s-opioid-policies (reporting on the Department of Justice’s enforcement 
actions, including a $35 million settlement with Mallinckrodt, shutting down a “dark web 
marketplace,” $150 million settlement with McKesson Corp., and a $44 million settlement 
with Cardinal Health). 
 158. See Substitute Resolution 12 and Resolution 218 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN 
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ORGANIZED MEDICAL STAFF SECTION, 2013 ANNUAL MEETING 12 
(2013). Substitute Resolution 12 states that the AMA deems “drug store requirements for 
verification of the rationale behind prescriptions, including diagnosis, treatment plan, ICD-9 
codes, and/or previous medications/therapies that were tried/failed, and for routine 
pharmacist calls for such verification of this rationale to be inappropriate interference with 
the practice of medicine and unwarranted.” Id. Resolution 218 continues that if 
“inappropriate pharmacist prescription verification requirements and inquire issues are not 
resolved promptly” that the AMA will seek legislative and regulatory remedies. Id. 
 159. Christine Powell, State AGs Widen Probe Into Opioid Makers, Distributors, 
LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/965535/state-ags-widen-probe-
into-opioid-makers-distributors (emphasis added). 
 160. See Rachel Graf, Ky. AG Hires Motley Rice, Others in Opioid Fight, LAW360 (Sept. 
22, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/966930/ky-ag-hires-motley-rice-others-in-
opioid-fight (reporting the Kentucky Attorney General received bids from “at least 53 firms” 
to assist with the investigation and potential litigation under a pure contingency fee basis). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/2
2018]        WHERE TORT LAW SHOULD DRAW THE LINE 387 
 
 
so opioid manufacturers, more than a dozen distributors and a handful of 
pharmacy chains.  
As Scruggs intimated, the goal of this “profusion” of litigation is not 
necessarily to win in court.
161
 In his view, “the success of the opioid cases 
will depend upon whether the plaintiffs can muster sufficient legal, political 
and public relations pressure to force a settlement.”
162
 University of 
Richmond Professor Carl Tobias estimated that if the private contingency 
fee counsel “can get 14 or 15 states to file against the drugmakers, that will 
put stress on the companies, cost wise, to defend these suits all over the 
country,” thereby forcing them to settle.
163
 Georgetown University 
Associate Professor Adriane Fugh-Berman, who has served as an expert 
witness in several cases against pharmaceutical companies, has suggested 
that publicity generated by the lawsuits, regardless of the suits’ legal merit, 
is “a great way to get information into the public domain.”
164
 Similarly, 
University of Florida Professor Lars Noah sees the litigation as “more of a 
publicity stunt,” saying “[t]hese theories have been tried with other 
industries that sell consumer goods and courts with rare exceptions have 
decided it is too much of a stretch.”
165
 
C. Courts Must Enforce the Elements of Public Nuisance Theory 
The reason manufacturers, along with distributors and retailers, are not 
subject to liability in these circumstances is because their responsibility is 
to put lawful, non-defective products into the market. There is not, and 
ought not be, a duty to police how consumers use or misuse products. 
Manufacturers cannot deny sales of their products at the retail level, and 
companies cannot stop end-users from abusing or improperly disposing of 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See Scruggs, supra note 144 (“The profusion of county and municipal plaintiffs (and 
a tribal nation) is different from tobacco, where only a few governmental subdivisions sued 
when their state attorneys general refused to join the litigation.”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Jef Feeley & Jared S. Hopkins, Big Pharmas’s Tobacco Moment as Star 
Lawyers Push Opioid Suits, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2017-08-15/south-carolina-joins-states-suing-purdue-pharma-over-opioids. 
Professor David Logan explained the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to recruit states: “The 
more states they have signed up, the bigger their hammer when it comes to decide who 
should be on the settlement negotiating committee.” Id. 
 164. Nate Hegyi, Cherokee Nation Sues Wal-Mart, CVS, Walgreens over Tribal Opioid 
Crisis, NPR (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/25/4858870 
58/cherokee-nation-sues-wal-mart-cvs-walgreens-over-tribal-opioid-crisis. 
 165. Harriet Ryan, City Devastated by OxyContin Use Sues Purdue Pharma, Claims 
Drugmaker Put Profits over Citizens' Welfare, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www. 
latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-oxycontin-lawsuit-20170118-story.html. 
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 The obligation to pay for injuries caused by these risks 
should remain with the wrongdoer, who should not be able to shift the costs 
of their misdeeds to others, even if those others have deeper pockets.  
There is nothing unique about the products discussed in this section. 
Many products, such as knives, matches, chemicals of all kinds, and even 
automobiles (which foreseeably may be used in ways that kill or injure if 
driven by an intoxicated driver) have inherent risks that are permissible and 
assumed by the consumer.
167
 Shifting liability to the manufacturer and 
others in the stream of commerce based on an open-ended “duty to 
monitor” would create a government “super tort” that could be invoked at 
the whim of any county, state, or municipal attorney.
168
 Such a super tort is 
nothing more than unprincipled, deep pocket jurisprudence.
169
  
III. Deep Pocket Jurisprudence Regarding Liability 
for Hirers of Independent Contractors 
Deep pocket jurisprudence is also infiltrating the decisions of businesses 
as to whether to staff certain operations with their own employees or hire 
independent contractors. From a business perspective, the decision often 
represents a trade-off between the cost structure and control companies 
have over their own employees versus the flexibility of retaining 
specialized workers for discrete tasks.
170
 An essential part of this calculus, 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 
825, 828 (1973) (stating that an auto manufacturer “would be liable for all damages 
produced by the car, a gun maker would be liable to anyone shot by the gun, anyone cut by a 
knife could sue the maker”). 
 167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 2 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 168. See Cty. of Johnson, Tenn. ex rel Bd. of Educ. V. U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 
284, 294 (governments could “convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance 
claim”).  
 169. Another unprincipled rationale for expanding public nuisance theory has been 
“regulation through litigation.” Throughout the past 50 years, there has been a little noticed, 
but definite trend: when some judges perceive the federal government is pulling back on 
regulation, they seek to fill this void by regulating through tort law. These judges believe 
they are the last check against activities that may harm the environment. Former Labor 
Secretary Robert Reich cautioned against such regulation through litigation as being against 
democratic government, where regulation is to be expanded (or contracted) by the executive 
and legislative branches. If these branches of government make the wrong choices, the 
remedy should be in the hands of voters, not judges. 
 170. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 431 (2d ed. 2011) (“The 
employer’s right to discharge the employee; payment of regular wages, taxes, workers’ 
compensation insurance and the like; long-term or permanent employment; and detailed 
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though, is the difference in the liability regime that governs each 
relationship.
171
 A company is generally subject to vicarious liability for 
injuries caused by its own employees but not for those caused by 
independent contractors.
172
 While courts have recognized limited 
exceptions to this rule,
173
 there have been unfortunate attempts to expand 
these exceptions far beyond their moorings and into the territory of deep 
pocket jurisprudence. The common theme in these suits is often that a large 
business hires a smaller independent contractor who subsequently causes 
the injury alleged. It is discovered that the independent contractor is 
judgment-proof or has inadequate resources to compensate the injured 
plaintiff. The plaintiff then sues the large business to add another, 
potentially deep pocket to pay the claim.
174
 
A. Liability for Acts of Independent Contractors Has Long Been Limited 
The longstanding rule that companies that hire independent contractors 
are not vicariously liable for the negligent or intentional acts of the 
contractor is grounded in principles of basic fairness.
175
 Because the hirer 
                                                                                                                 
supervision of the work tend to indicate a master-servant relationship.”); see also Rev. Rul. 
87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (identifying twenty factors indicative of an employer-employee 
relationship to aid in making such determinations).  
 171. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 170, § 431 (“Jurists have found it difficult to 
formulate a crisp and workable definition of independent contractors, but the concept is easy 
to understand. . . .”); Robert W. Wood, Defining Employees and Independent Contractors: 
Don’t Try This at Home!, BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 2008, at 45, 45 (“The classification of 
workers can be difficult and consequential. The laws are vague and serve different purposes. 
They are enforced by different agencies, including the IRS, state unemployment and 
workers’ compensation agencies, insurance companies, and the courts. These parties use 
different criteria, have different reasons for making decisions, and reach different decisions 
regarding the same working relationship.”). 
 172. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 170, § 431 (“As the courts see it, it is the 
contractor’s business, the contractor’s tort, and the contractor’s liability.”); see PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 30, § 71, at 509.  
 173. See Deanna N. Conn, When Contract Should Preempt Tort Remedies: Limits on 
Vicarious Liability for Acts of Independent Contractors, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
179, 188-89 (2009) (stating that “the outcome of the employee status determination is often 
‘results driven’” and that “courts often ‘stretch’ in applying the various factors to find 
employee status”). 
 174. As the Supreme Court explained more than a half century ago: “Few problems in 
the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising 
in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is 
clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.” NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 
121 (1944), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 175. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 170, § 431. 
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has no right of control over the manner in which the work is to 
be done, it is to be regarded as the contractor’s own enterprise, 
and he, rather than the [hiring company], is the proper party to 
be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk, and 
administering and distributing it.
176
 
This relationship is in contrast to the employer-employee relationship, 
where vicarious liability may be permitted because the employer is in the 




As indicated, courts have recognized a few limited exceptions that may 
allow such liability to be imposed against the company who hires the 
independent contractor. These exceptions fall into three general categories: 
injuries from the hirer’s own negligence, injuries during the performance of 
non-delegable duties, and injuries from inherently dangerous activities.
178
 
In each situation, there is a principled rationale for extending liability to the 
company that hires the independent contractor. 
In the first category, the hiring company is not truly “innocent” or 
removed from the negligence that caused harm. A hirer who retains 
sufficient control over the independent contractor’s work or undertakes a 
specific obligation (such as providing safety equipment or machinery used 
by the independent contractor) may be subject to vicarious liability for 
harm caused by the independent contractor.
179
 In determining whether the 
degree of a hirer’s retained control is sufficient to impose vicarious liability, 
courts have considered a variety of factors, including the party’s allocation 
of responsibilities in their contract, the hirer’s ability to select or terminate 




                                                                                                                 
 176. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 71, at 509; see also Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 
827 P.2d 102, 108 (N.M. 1992) (“The absence of a right of control over the manner in which 
the work is to be done is the most commonly accepted criterion for distinguishing 
independent contractors from employees . . . .”) (citing Prosser & Keeton). 
 177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 57 
cmt. c (2012) (“[I]n hirer-independent contractor settings, the independent contractor is the 
person or entity that regularly benefits from the risk-creating enterprise.”). 
 178. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 71, at 510-15; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 
170, § 432; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 57 cmt. f (excluding “collateral negligence” doctrine as a separate category of 
exceptions to general rule of non-liability for hirers of independent contractors). 
 179. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, § 71, at 510-11; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979). 
 180. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 170, § 431. 
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The non-delegable duties exception is limited to situations where the 
hirer has “a responsibility that should not be considered discharged when 
the actor, albeit with reasonable care, hires a contractor to perform the 
work.”
181
 For example, a business ordinarily may not immunize itself from 
its duties as a landowner simply by hiring an independent contractor to 
perform work on its property.
182
 Similarly, the hirer of an independent 
contractor may not be able to avoid liability arising from duties imposed by 
statute, such as laws regarding property maintenance or workplace safety, 
by outsourcing these responsibilities to a contractor.
183
  
Finally, the “inherently dangerous activities” exception applies to 
situations where the nature of the activity is so fraught with risk that the 
hirer of an independent contractor should not be permitted to avoid its own 
liability simply by using a contractor for that activity.
184
 This situation is 
generally limited to two situations: abnormally dangerous activities and 
activities that have a “peculiar” or “special” risk of harm.
185
 The high risks 
of harm associated with an abnormally dangerous activity, such as working 
with explosives, cannot be avoided even through reasonable care.
186
 An 
activity posing a “peculiar” risk poses “a special danger to those in the 
vicinity, arising out of the particular situation created, and calling for 
special precautions.”
187
 Hiring an independent contractor to demolish a 
                                                                                                                 
 181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 57 
cmt. b. 
 182. See id. § 62 (stating that a land possessor may be subject to vicarious liability for an 
activity on the land where the possessor “retains possession of the premises during the 
activity or after the possessor has resumed possession of the land upon the completion of the 
activity”). 
 183. See id. § 63 (stating that a land possessor may be subject to vicarious liability where 
“a statute or administrative regulation imposes an obligation on the actor to take specific 
precautions for the safety of others”). 
 184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also 41 
AM. JUR. 2d Independent Contractors § 52 (2016) (listing activities); Ellen S. Pryor, 
Peculiar Risks in American Tort Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 393, 395-97 (2011) (discussing rule 
of peculiar risk as applied to hirers of independent contractors). 
 185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 
58-59; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416, 427A. 
 186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 58 
cmt. b; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A. 
 187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 cmt. b; see also id. §§ 416, 427 (discussing 
inherent and peculiar risk exceptions to non-liability for hirers of independent contractors); 
Pryor, supra note 184, at 396. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM expresses the peculiar risk exception as one in which there 
is an inherent risk of harm that may be prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, but if 
reasonable care is not exercised, the resulting risk “differs from the types of risk usual in the 
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house with a shared wall is an example of a situation calling for special 
precautions.
188
 The hirer may be subject to liability if the contractor’s 
inadequate shoring of the shared wall damages the adjoining home.
189
 
These liability rules have long provided principled, clear lines of 
responsibility between the hiring companies and their independent 
contractors.  
B. The Use of Deep Pocket Jurisprudence to Subject Hirers to Vicarious 
Liability for the Tortious Acts of Independent Contractors  
Unfortunately, some courts have begun to distort these exceptions in 
order to pin liability on companies that hire independent contractors when 
the companies have greater financial resources than the contractors to pay 
claims. Some of these cases have attracted national headlines due to the 
sheer scope of their financial impact and concern.  
A recent, high-profile example surrounds litigation against ride-hailing 
logistics providers Uber and Lyft.
190
 These companies typically do not own 
or operate the vehicles used to transport passengers; instead, they allow 
drivers to sign up as independent contractors. A set of cases against Uber 
and Lyft alleges that the companies are improperly classifying drivers as 
independent contractors instead of employees.
191
 Because of the importance 
of classification for liability purposes, whether the companies retain 
sufficient control over the conduct of the drivers to subject them to liability 
in the event a driver commits a tortious act has become a key issue in the 
cases.
192
 In 2016, Uber agreed to pay up to $100 million to settle a class 
action suit challenging its business model of hiring drivers as independent 
                                                                                                                 
community.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
59 cmt. b. 
 188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416, ill. 1. 
 189. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
identifies the hiring of an independent contractor to transport prisoners as another example 
of the peculiar risk exception; the hirer would not avoid vicarious liability for the 
independent contractor’s negligence in allowing potentially dangerous prisoners to escape 
and cause injury to members of the surrounding community. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 59, ill. 3. 
 190. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2016); O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., Case No. 
8:16-cv-166-T-30MAP, 2016 WL 2348706 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2016); Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 
199 F. Supp. 3d 284 (D. Mass. 2016); Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., Civ. Action No. 16-573, 
2016 WL 3960556 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2016).  
 191. See cases cited supra note 190. 
 192. See cases cited supra note 190. 
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 As part of the settlement, Uber was able to retain its drivers’ 




Plaintiffs alleging injury from an Uber or Lyft driver have also sought to 
subject the companies to liability as hirers of independent contractors.
195
 In 
2014, the family of a young boy struck and killed by a driver who was 
allegedly waiting for the Uber program to “match” him with a passenger 
sought to hold Uber vicariously liable for the wrongful death.
196
 Uber 
defended the claim on the basis that, as a logistics provider (and not a 
transportation carrier), it has an express independent contractor relationship 
with its drivers and should not be subject to liability in these 
circumstances.
197
 This lawsuit remains pending at the time of this writing.  
Traditional transportation logistics providers have faced similar lawsuits. 
In 2015, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a trial court’s award of $8 
million against a trucking logistics provider after a tractor-trailer driver 
hired as an independent contractor killed a woman standing by her disabled 
vehicle on the shoulder of the highway.
198
 The logistics provider, 
Transfreight, was hired by Toyota to ensure a steady supply of automotive 
parts to its production facilities.
199
 Transfreight then contracted with a 
separate motor carrier to manage pick-up and delivery.
200
 The agreement 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See Dan Levine, Uber Drivers Remain Independent Contractors as Lawsuit Settled, 
REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-drivers-settlement-
idUSKCN0XJ07H; Richard Reibstein, Ride-Sharing Leaders Settling for Up to $100 Million – 
Will The Settlement Withstand Judicial Scrutiny?, INDEP. CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION & 
COMPLIANCE (Apr. 22, 2016), https://independentcontractorcompliance.com/2016/04/22/ uber-
tries-to-lyft-itself-out-of-two-independent-contractor-misclassification-lawsuits-by-settling-for-
up-to-100-million-but-will-the-settlement-withstand-judicial-scrutin/. 
 194. See Levine, supra note 193. 
 195. See Complaint for Damages & Demand for Trial by Jury, Liu v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2014); Answer and Affirmative Defenses of 
Uber Techs., Inc., Rasier LLC, and Rasier-CA LLC to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 6, Liu v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2014); Josh Constine, 
Uber’s Denial of Liability in Girl’s Death Raises Accident Accountability Questions, 
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 2, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/02/should-car-services-provide-
insurance-whenever-their-driver-app-is-open/; Kale Williams, Uber Denies Fault in S.F. 
Crash That Killed Girl, SFGATE (May 7, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/ 
Uber-denies-fault-in-S-F-crash-that-killed-girl-5458290.php. 
 196. See sources cited supra note 195. 
 197. See sources cited supra note 195. 
 198. See McHale v. W.D. Trucking, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132625, ¶ 1, 39 N.E.3d 595, 
604-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 199. See id. ¶ 7, 39 N.E.3d at 605-06. 
 200. See id. 
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between Transfreight and the motor carrier expressly defined the 
independent contractor relationship and assigned the motor carrier 
responsibility for providing the actual “transportation services” as well as 
supervising the loading and unloading of the trailers.
201
 The motor carrier 
also retained “sole and exclusive control over the manner in which [it] and 
its employees perform[ed] the Transportation Services.”
202
 Nevertheless, 
the plaintiff named Transfreight in the suit, as the motor carrier maintained 
only $1 million in liability insurance.
203
  
The jury’s verdict holding Transfreight and the motor carrier jointly 
responsible for the $8 million wrongful death award was predicated on a 
finding that Transfreight retained enough control over the motor carrier to 
subject Transfreight to vicarious liability.
204
 While the appellate court 
observed that the “jury heard ample evidence showing Transfreight did not 
have the right to control” the motor carrier’s employee, it chose not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury and allowed the finding of 
liability to stand.
205
 In doing so, the court allowed the award against the 
deep pocket defendant. 
In a case outside the transportation industry, the Washington Supreme 
Court held that a fugitive injured by the negligence of a bounty hunter 
could sue the bail-bonding company that retained the independent 
contractor who, in turn, hired the bounty hunter.
206
 The bounty hunter 
struck the fugitive with his car, causing serious injuries.
207
 The Court 
concluded that the bail-bonding company could be subject to vicarious 
liability under the peculiar risk exception because there is a high risk of 
harm in bail bond recovery.
208
  
A dissenting justice, however, explained that this is not a situation 
envisioned by the peculiar risk exception.
209
 “The peculiar risk exception 
exists because certain activities pose a risk that people are not commonly 
subjected to and thus do not anticipate the need for taking precautions,” but 
when the independent contractor “chooses to voluntarily participate in the 
activity anyway, the risk is no longer ‘peculiar’ as to that individual.”
210
 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Id. ¶ 9, 39 N.E.2d at 606. 
 202. Id. ¶ 6, 39 N.E.2d at 605.  
 203. See id. ¶ 14, 39 N.E.2d at 608.  
 204. See id. ¶¶ 70, 71, 39 N.E.2d at 620-21.  
 205. Id. ¶ 65, 39 N.E.2d at 618.  
 206. See Stout v. Warren, 290 P.3d 972 (Wash. 2012). 
 207. See id. at 976. 
 208. See id. at 982. 
 209. See id. (Owens, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id.  
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Under the majority’s holding, vicarious liability would be allowed for any 
risk that is unusual in some way or “not a normal, routine matter of 
customary human activity.”
211
 The majority’s standard is exceedingly broad 
and lacks a viable, clearly delineated limiting principle. 
There have been many other attempts to sidestep the general rule of non-
liability for hirers of independent contractors in the search for deep pockets 
to pay claims.
212
 For example, suits have claimed that activities such as 









 and working at a plant
217
 are “inherently dangerous” and 
should therefore permit vicarious liability against the hirer of the 
independent contractor that performed them.
218
 Suits have further sought to 
expand the scope of the general rule exception for non-delegable duties.
219
 
A common denominator in the successful attempts to impose broad new 
vicarious liability against the hirer of an independent contractor is result-
driven, deep pocket jurisprudence.  
IV. Deep Pocket Jurisprudence in Car Accident Cases 
Deep pocket jurisprudence is regularly the hidden foundation for product 
liability claims in automobile cases. A common example is where a drunk 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Id. at 977 (majority opinion) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 cmt. 
b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977)). 
 212. See, e.g., Valenti v. NET Props. Mgmt., Inc., 710 A.2d 399, 400 (N.H. 1998) 
(stating that the general rule of non-liability for hirers of independent contractors is now “so 
riddled with exceptions” that the “exceptions ... have practically subsumed the rule”) 
(citations omitted). 
 213. See Lammert v. Lesco Auto Sales, 936 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 214. See Montano v. O’Connell, 589 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (App. Div. 1992). 
 215. See Bowles v. Weld Tire & Wheel, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).  
 216. See Doak v. Green, 677 So. 2d 301, 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 217. See Burger v. Midland Cogeneration Venture, 507 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 218. Courts have split on the inherently dangerous nature of other activities. Compare 
Brandenburg v. Briarwood Forestry Servs., LLC, 2014 WI 37, ¶ 64, 354 Wis.2d 413, 847 
N.W.2d 395, 412 (holding that independent contractor’s spraying of herbicide was 
inherently dangerous activity) with Wilson v. Greg Williams Farm, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 
334, at 6, 436 S.W.3d 485, 489 (holding that independent contractor’s aerial application of 
herbicide was not inherently dangerous activity). 
 219. See Randall Noe Chrysler Dodge, LLP v. Oakley Tire Co., 308 S.W.3d 542, 546-47 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (independent contractor’s job of painting a building with a spray 
apparatus was not a nondelegable duty); Baboghlian v. Swift Elec. Supply Co., 964 A.2d 
304, 309 (N.J. 2009) (property owner did not have a nondelegable duty to obtain a permit 
and inspect independent contractor’s installation of fire alarm system). 
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driver, who lacks sufficient insurance, hits another car, causing severe 
injuries, and the victim sues the manufacturer of his or her own car for 
compensation.
220
 To justify recovery, the victim alleges the manufacturer 
failed to design a car that would protect against or mitigate injury in the 
event of such a collision.
221
 The design defect theory may be highly 
speculative, but is supported by the plaintiff’s “experts.”
222
 Some courts, 
particularly when the plaintiff’s injuries are severe, have failed to act as 
good science gatekeepers and have ignored the standards controlling the 
admission of these “experts’” testimonies. They allow novel or 
unsubstantiated opinions to facilitate recovery, as the deep-pocket 
automobile manufacturer ends up paying the at-fault party’s liability.
223
 
The desire for innocent car accident victims to be compensated is 
understandable, but not at the expense of turning a blind eye to the law and 
the need for liability to be based only on credible scientific evidence. The 
downside of deep pocket jurisprudence in such situations is that it forces 
companies to re-design their cars based on faulty scientific conclusions, 
which could have major, negative impacts on overall public safety.
224
 
A. Automobile Design Liability Should Remain Principled 
Starting with the landmark case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
225
 car 
owners and passengers have been able to sue automobile manufacturers 
directly when an alleged product defect causes injury. Judge Cardozo, in 
this famed 1916 opinion, removed the privity of contract requirement 
between a car owner and its manufacturer that had previously blocked these 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See Ellen M. Bublick, The Tort–Proof Plaintiff: The Drunk in the Automobile, 
Crashworthiness Claims, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 707, 707 
(2009) (“State courts face a difficult challenge when they review crashworthiness claims that 
arise in conjunction with drunk driving.”). 
 221. See id.  
 222. See William Petrus, Injury Causation Experts Prevent Cases from Crashing, TRIAL, 
Aug. 2000, at 54, 54 (“[W]hen handling a vehicle crashworthiness case, expert testimony 
detailing exactly how and why a plaintiff suffered injuries is essential.”); see also Jeffrey F. 
Ghent, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller, or Distributor of Motor Vehicle for Defect Which 
Merely Enhances Injury from Accident Otherwise Caused, 42 A.L.R. 3d 560 (1972) (“If the 
case is complex, the attorney may have to become a quasi-expert on motor vehicle design.”). 
 223. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the 
Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 220-26 
(2006) (discussing importance of courts fulfilling their “gatekeeper” function with respect to 
the admission of scientific expert evidence). 
 224. See infra Section IV.A. 
 225. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/2





 The car defect in MacPherson was easy to understand; the wooden 
spokes on one of the wheels crumbled into fragments, and MacPherson was 
thrown from the car and seriously injured.
227
 Judge Cardozo explained that 
the evidence showed a defect in the wheel that could have been discovered 
by a reasonable inspection.
228
 For the next half-century, liability rules for 
automobile manufacturers remained relatively consistent: if a 
manufacturer’s negligence resulted in defective brakes, steering wheels, or 
any other part of the car, and that defect led to an injury, the manufacturer 
could be subject to liability.
229
  
During the 1960s, liability for car manufacturers shifted with the advent 
of products liability theories. The application of products liability was 
relatively straight-forward with respect to manufacturing defects such as the 
one in MacPherson, but courts struggled to apply these concepts to design 
and warning defects.
230
 At the same time, states began to recognize a new 
duty in tort law that required automobile manufacturers to make their cars 
“reasonably crashworthy.”
231
 As a result, the manufacturer could be found 
liable, both when a defect caused the crash and when a crash was caused by 
an independent wrongdoer (such as a drunk driver) so long as some defect 
in the vehicle did not adequately protect the car’s passengers. To apportion 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See id. at 1055 (“Both by its relation to the work and by the nature of its business, 
[the manufacturer] is charged with a stricter duty.”); see also R. Ben Hogan, The 
Crashworthiness Doctrine, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 37, 37 (1994) (“Modern product 
liability law, and ultimately crashworthiness law, traces its history to MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co.”). 
 227. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.  
 228. Id. at 1051, 1055 (“[Manufacturer] was not at liberty to put the finished product on 
the market without subjecting the component parts to ordinary and simple tests.”). 
 229. See Hogan, supra note 226, at 37-38 (discussing development of automotive design 
liability); G. Franco Mondini, The Doctrine of “Crashworthiness” in Texas: Movement 
Toward a Workable Solution, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 889, 891-93 (1984) (discussing history of 
crashworthiness doctrine beginning in 1960s). 
 230. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (Mich. 1984) 
(“Imposing a negligence standard for design defect litigation is only to define in a coherent 
fashion what our litigants in this case are in fact arguing and what our jurors are in essence 
analyzing.”). 
 231. See Mondini, supra note 229, at 893 (referring to “doctrine variously known as 
‘crashworthiness,’ enhanced injury, or second-collision”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1998) (“A manufacturer has a duty 
to design and manufacture its product so as reasonably to reduce the foreseeable harm that 
may occur in an accident brought about by causes other than a product defect.”); Thomas V. 
Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C. L. REV. 643, 645 (1984) 
(noting the then “undeveloped state of enhanced injury theory” and the “need to formulate 
rules in a logical and evenhanded manner”). 
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fault, courts began to look at all causes of an injury, assessing who was at 
fault for the crash itself and whether a design defect caused or failed to 
properly mitigate injuries caused to the plaintiff in the “secondary collision” 
between the plaintiff and the inside of the car.
232
  
Determining whether a design defect exists for either purpose often 
involves a risk utility or other comparable test. The inquiry is often 
determining whether there was a “reasonable alternative design” for that 
part of the vehicle or whether the manufacturer was negligent in how it 
designed the part that allegedly failed.
233
 Given the complex, technical 
nature of today’s automobiles, proof of such a design defect often relies on 
expert evidence.
234
 A court’s improper application of admissibility 
standards for expert evidence, therefore, can have a significant impact on 
liability. Should the court allow novel, unsubstantiated expert testimony, a 
jury may award a severely injured, innocent plaintiff a large recovery, not 
only against the actual wrongdoer but also the automobile manufacturer, 
making it the de facto insurer of its products.
235
 Some courts have defended 
their deep pocket jurisprudence decisions on the basis that the manufacturer 
was best able to afford the cost of injuries.
236
  
B. Automobile Cases Predicated on Deep Pocket Jurisprudence  
In recent years, several appellate courts have identified and stopped deep 
pocket evidentiary and legal rulings by their trial courts. As dispassionate 
reviewers of the facts and law, they have overturned decisions where local 
                                                                                                                 
 232. See Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 
55 CAL. L. REV. 645, 655-59 (1967) (discussing early “second collision” cases). 
 233. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (stating 
“reasonable alternative design” requirement to demonstrate product design defect); id. § 16 
cmt. b (“In connection with a design defect claim in the context of increased harm, the 
plaintiff must establish that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced plaintiff’s 
harm.”). 
 234. See id. § 16 cmt. b, cmt. c (stating need for competent expert evidence to prove an 
automotive design defect). 
 235. See Kelly Carbetta-Scandy, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases: Complex Issues, 
Empty Precedents, and Unpredictable Results, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1288-92 (1986) 
(discussing case example that “exemplifies the extreme unfairness to manufacturers when a 
court delivers a crashworthiness case to the jury as a design defect case and allows recovery 
for all the consequences of an accident in which the manufacturer played no role in 
precipitating”). 
 236. See infra Section IV.B; cf. Passwaters v. Gen. Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277 
(8th Cir. 1972) (stating in automobile design defect case that the “acceptance of strict 
liability is based on policy considerations of spreading the risk to the manufacturer as the 
party financially best able to afford the cost of injuries”).  
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judges and juries granted recoveries that impeded, not facilitated, the even-
handed pursuit of justice.  
1. The Virginia Supreme Court’s Trilogy of Expert Evidence Cases 
From 2013 to 2016, the Virginia Supreme Court decided three cases that, 
together, restored the rule of law in Virginia with respect to expert evidence 
in car accident cases. In the first two cases, Funkhouser v. Ford Motor 
Co.
237
 and Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd. v. Duncan,
238
 the court declared 
motions in limine proper to establish fundamental principles for 
admissibility of expert evidence. First, in Funkhouser, two young children 
climbed into their parents’ minivan that was turned off and parked in the 
garage when the minivan caught fire.
239
 The court ruled that the accident 
did not speak for itself; the expert must identify the defect he alleged 
caused the fire, and his testimony must be based on facts relevant to that 
defect, not on dissimilar car fires.
240
  
Second, in Duncan, the court clarified that scientific testimony cannot be 
based on unsubstantiated assumptions. In order to testify as to the viability 
of a reasonable alternative design, the expert must have an evidentiary basis 
for his or her theory.
241
 In this case, the plaintiff was involved in a one-car 
accident, where he lost control of the car, swerved off the road, and hit a 
tree.
242
 He alleged that if the sensors for the vehicle’s side airbags were 
located in a different place, they would have been triggered and he may 
have sustained lesser injuries.
243
 But the expert never tested the location 
that he suggested for the sensors and could not determine whether people in 
other types of crashes would be injured if the sensor were moved to that 
location.
244
 Automobile designs often involve trade-offs in an attempt to 
                                                                                                                 
 237. 736 S.E.2d 309 (Va. 2013). 
 238. 766 S.E.2d 893 (Va. 2015). 
 239. 736 S.E.2d at 311. 
 240. Id. at 315-16. 
 241. Duncan, 736 S.E.2d at 897 (finding that the expert’s “opinion that the 2008 Tiburon 
was unreasonably dangerous was without sufficient evidentiary support because it was 
premised upon his assumption that the side airbag would have deployed if the sensor was at 
his proposed location—an assumption that clearly lacked a sufficient factual basis and 
disregarded the variables he acknowledged as bearing upon the sensor location 
determination.”). 
 242. Id. at 894. 
 243. Id. at 894-95. 
 244. Id. at 895 (“While [the expert] believed the best location for the sensor was at the B-
pillar, he testified he did no testing to determine if the side airbag would have deployed in 
Gage’s accident had the sensor been placed at any other location.”). 
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balance safety, utility, and cost, and these trade-offs must be considered. 
The alternative design must work, be cost-effective, and provide overall 
risk utility benefits to the consuming public.  
In the third case, despite these clear rulings, a Virginia trial court 
engaged in deep pocket jurisprudence when it allowed an expert to testify 
that a ragtop convertible could be deemed defective if it did not protect a 
woman from being injured in a rollover collision.
245
 In Holiday Motor 
Corp. v. Walters, the plaintiff was driving a Miata ragtop convertible and 
suffered serious injuries when a pool fell off the truck in front of her.
246
 The 
plaintiff swerved to avoid the pool, causing the vehicle to roll over several 
times.
247
 The driver of the truck never stopped.
248
 With no one else to sue 
for her substantial injuries, she sued Mazda even though the Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standards, which sets roof crush resistance standards for 
vehicles, specifically exempts ragtop convertibles.
249
 Without the frame of a 
hardtop roof, the essential structure for rollover protection is missing, a 
known trade-off inherent to ragtop convertibles.
250
 
To support her design defect theory, the court permitted an expert to 
testify that the small latches that hold the ragtop to the windshield are, in 
essence, linchpins for providing rollover protection comparable to “a sedan 
with a permanent roof structure.”
251
 The expert alleged that the latches 
became disengaged during the accident, which is why the ragtop and 
windshield failed to protect the plaintiff.
252
 The expert did not include 
reliance on any engineering papers, literature, or written standards, nor did 
he perform any testing or analysis of the latching system for the convertible 
or any other comparable vehicle.
253
 The lack of a systematic approach to 
these scientific theories is not surprising given that there is no body of 
science that can prove that a ragtop convertible could reasonably provide 
rollover protection. Nevertheless, after the circuit court denied the 
defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the expert’s testimony, the trial 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Holiday Motor Corp. v. Walters, 790 S.E.2d 447, 450-53 (Va. 2016).  
 246. Id. at 449.  
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.  
 249. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.216 (2009); see also Death Rates Aren’t Higher in 
Convertibles, but a Roof Still Is Safer, STATUS REP (May 31, 2007), 
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/sr/statusreport/article/42/6/3.  
 250. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 679 (6th Cir. 1972) (noting “it 
is obvious that a soft top convertible is inherently incapable of passing” a rollover test). 
 251. Holiday Motor Corp. 790 S.E.2d at 452. 
 252. Id. at 458. 
 253. See id. at 452. 
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The Virginia Supreme Court overturned the ruling, explaining the lack 
“of a permanent roof structure necessarily diminishes the level of occupant 
rollover protection” and that this feature is not only “characteristic of a 
convertible . . . it is ‘the unique feature of the vehicle.’”
255
 Consequently, 
“imposing a duty upon manufacturers of convertible soft tops to provide 
occupant rollover protection defies both ‘common sense’ and ‘good 
policy.’”
256
 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the testimony of 
the automotive engineer as being “pure speculation” based on “unfounded 
assumptions” and not supported by “testing or analysis.”
257
  
There is a particular danger in cases such as this one, where a plaintiff is 
seriously injured, the party at fault is not before the court, and an expert 
devises a plausible-enough-sounding theory for finding an alternative, 
deeper pocket for compensation. 
2. The Kentucky Supreme Court Stops a Deep Pocket Punitive Damage 
Award that Would Have Undermined Government Safety Standards 
Factual and legal theories for a case that stretch credulity can also be 
used as the basis for punitive damage awards, not solely for design defect 
claims. In Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Maddox,
258
 which involved a head-on 
collision caused “by a drunk driver who was driving on the wrong side of 
the road,” the trial court entered a judgment against Nissan that included 
$2.5 million in punitive damages.
259
 The reason this case epitomizes deep-
pocket jurisprudence is that the trial court allowed the plaintiff to subject 
Nissan to punitive damages, ironically, because Nissan diligently adhered 
to federal safety standards. The plaintiff’s counsel, taking a page out of DC 
Comics’ upside-down Bizarro World, argued that Nissan’s stellar safety 
ratings for the seat belt design at issue were actually proof that Nissan 
flagrantly disregarded her safety.  
In the case, it was undisputed that the 2001 Nissan Pathfinder in which 
the plaintiff was a passenger met or exceeded all applicable government 
safety standards for seat belt restraint systems. This included both the 
                                                                                                                 
 254. See id. at 449, 458-59. 
 255. Id. at 456 (quoting Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1074 (4th 
Cir. 1974)). 
 256. Id. at 457 (quoting Jeld–Wen, Inc. v. Gamble, 501 S.E.2d 393, 397 (Va. 1998)). 
 257. Id. at 458-59. 
 258. 486 S.W.3d 838 (Ky. 2015). 
 259. Id. at 839.  
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mandatory Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and the voluntary, more 
stringent safety standards under the New Car Assessment Program. The 
right front passenger restraint system, which the plaintiff was utilizing, 
received five stars, the highest possible rating.
260
 The lower court allowed 
the plaintiff to rhetorically use this safety record as clear and convincing 
evidence of Nissan’s outrageous or malicious conduct toward her. The 
plaintiff, who weighed 240 pounds, claimed that the passenger restraint 
system recklessly disregarded the safety of large occupants because it was 
designed to maximize protection for the 171-pound test dummies used in 
the safety tests.
261
 As a result, she claimed, the seat belt assembly could not 
sustain her weight, causing her to submarine under the lap belt.
262
 Her 
lawyer’s theme for seeking punitive damages was “stars over safety.”
263
 
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed this ruling in 2015, stating that 
the “undisputed evidence demonstrates that Nissan designed its 2001 
Pathfinder . . . to withstand the most rigorous frontal crash testing offered” 
and that this fact established a level of due care precluding any punitive 
award.
264
 The court explained that although the plaintiff’s injuries “were 
monumental, the evidence presented at trial fails to indicate that such an 
outcome was the result of Nissan’s reckless or wanton disregard for [the 
plaintiff] or those similarly situated.”
265
 Here, the pursuit of deep pocket 
jurisprudence, if it was allowed to stand, could have seriously undermined 
adherence to government safety standards.  
3. The Illinois Supreme Court Reverses a Deep Pocket Award that Could 
Have Led to More Dangerous Designs 
A set of deep pocket jurisprudence cases that can be challenging to 
identify and correct involve car features designed to maximize safety for 
most people, but which nonetheless may have led to injury in the case at 
bar. In these cases, the only person before the court is someone alleging 
injury from the design, not the many people who may have benefited from 
it. Consequently, the “fix” offered by a plaintiff’s experts may be enticing 
because it would have legitimately avoided the plaintiff’s injuries. But, if 
implemented, the plaintiff’s fix would jeopardize the health and safety of 
far more people. Accordingly, there is no design defect to correct. 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Id. at 841. 
 261. Id. at 841, 845.  
 262. Id. at 842.  
 263. Id. at 839. 
 264. Id. at 843. 
 265. Id. at 845. 
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A car safety feature that has been the subject of several lawsuits in recent 
years is a front car seat designed to “yield” or be flexible during a crash in 
order to absorb some of the force, rather than be rigid and direct more force 
at the occupant. The Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co.,
266
 where a drunk driver who “shared two 
pints of gin with a friend before getting behind the wheel” of his car 
crashed “into the rear of a 1996 Ford Escort . . . stopped at a red light.”
267
 
The driver of the Escort died after allegedly striking his head on the car’s 
backseat when his “yielding seat” flattened backwards.
268
 In addition to 
suing the drunk driver, the wife sued Ford arguing the yielding seat was 
“unreasonably dangerous.”
269
 The plaintiff’s experts, though, admitted that 
a yielding seat design is actually safer in many circumstances, such as when 
an occupant is out-of-position in the seat.
270
 Nevertheless, the jury returned 
a $27 million verdict, finding Ford and the designer of the car seat forty 
percent at-fault and the drunk driver sixty percent at-fault.
271
 The Illinois 
high court reversed the lower court’s decision due to faulty jury instructions 
and remanded it for a new trial.
272
  
The Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Walker v. 
Ford Motor Co.
273
 In this case, the court rejected the trial court’s jury 
instructions regarding a “consumer expectations” standard for assessing an 
alleged car seat design defect that resulted in a $3 million verdict against 
Ford.
274
 The court held that the proper standard for evaluating alleged 
design defects is a risk-utility analysis because it requires the jury to engage 




The key to avoiding the deep pocket jurisprudence trap in these cases is 
to make sure the jury can assess the overall value of the feature when 
determining whether a product has a design defect. States that follow the 
risk-utility test for design defects, for example, have found that weighing 
                                                                                                                 
 266. 901 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2008). 
 267. Id. at 333. 
 268. See id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 870 N.E.2d 885, 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), rev’d on 
other grounds, 901 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2008). 
 271. Id. at 893. 
 272. Mikolajczyk, 901 N.E.2d at 360.  
 273. No. 15SC899, 2017 WL 5248198 (Colo. Nov. 13, 2017). 
 274. Id. at *2, *5.  
 275. Id. at *4-5.  
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the overall value of a design is essential for complex, technical products.
276
 
The test directs juries to consider the technology available to the 
manufacturer at the time and how the proposed modification would affect 
the product’s usefulness, desirability, and affordability. It also helps avoid 
evaluating product safety in hindsight and with regard only to the injured 
plaintiff before them. In short, a balancing test of some kind, such as the 
risk-utility test, can give juries a rudder for steering through expert 
testimony so that they do not impose liability on manufacturers that 
responsibly design products to safely meet consumer needs. 
Conclusion 
Experience shows that deep pocket jurisprudence is most likely to occur 
when (a) the victim is truly innocent and therefore highly sympathetic, or 
the damage is done to the environment; (b) the injuries or contamination are 
severe; (c) the true wrongdoer is unavailable for the litigation, does not 
have sufficient funds to pay the claim, or would not be able to address the 
problem on a large-scale basis; and (d) the risk of harm was arguably 
foreseeable to the defendant. Rhetorically, the plaintiffs argue that because 
the deep-pocketed defendant profited from its business, it should shoulder 
the costs of the harm.  
The natural impulse to want to help a severely injured victim or 
remediate extensive environmental damage is certainly understandable. 
Courts, though, must be grounded by the rule of law. Legal doctrines such 
as negligent misrepresentation, public nuisance, vicarious liability, and 
products liability all have elements that must be proved based on credible 
facts and sound scientific analysis. Courts must refrain from becoming 
mere compensation mechanisms for transferring money from businesses to 
injured people. Rather, they must remain places where justice can be 
achieved and where businesses are only required to pay victims that they 
wrongfully injured or to clean up environmental harms that they wrongfully 
caused. Liability rules must remain based on sound principles of law, not 
deep pocket jurisprudence. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 276. See Aaron Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturer’s Liability for 
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1067 
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defect over the past several decades had embraced risk-utility balancing and had rejected the 
consumer expectations test as unworkable and unwise.”). 
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